Extending the medium hypothesis: The Dennett-Mangan controversy and beyond
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):237-257 (2004)
Mangan’s hypothesis, that consciousness is an information-bearing medium, presents an alternative to Dennett’s brand of functionalism, and Dennett’s counterattacks have yet to address Mangan’s main assertion. The medium hypothesis does not entail Cartesian theater assumptions concerning the localization, causal status, and “filling in” of consciousness in the brain. In principle, it is compatible with distributed information transfer between different media, epiphenomenalism, and gaps in visual experience. However, Mangan’s strongest empirical argument, based on consciousness’ limited “bandwidth,” does not necessarily show that transduction between media of different information-bearing capacities occurs between the brain and consciousness. The features of consciousness that he attributes to a lower bandwidth medium can be explained in terms of functional constraints on a single medium. Furthermore, empirical results showing gaps and anomalies in visual experience speak against consciousness being a medium
|Keywords||Consciousness Functionalism Medium Metaphysics Realizability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Karl F. MacDorman, Sandosh K. Vasudevan & Chin-Chang Ho (2009). Does Japan Really Have Robot Mania? Comparing Attitudes by Implicit and Explicit Measures. AI and Society 23 (4):485-510.
Similar books and articles
Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.
André Kukla (1994). Medium AI and Experimental Science. Philosophical Psychology 7 (4):493-5012.
Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review: The Message Is: There is No Medium. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):919 - 931.
Mehdi Nasrin (2000). Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.
Michael V. Antony (2002). Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory of Consciousness. Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-370.
John Dilworth (2003). Medium, Subject Matter and Representation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):45-62.
Lutz Preuss & Jack Perschke (2010). Slipstreaming the Larger Boats: Social Responsibility in Medium-Sized Businesses. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 92 (4):531 - 551.
Bruce Mangan (1993). Dennett, Consciousness, and the Sorrows of Functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):1-17.
Bruce Mangan (1998). Against Functionalism: Consciousness as an Information-Bearing Medium. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press 2--135.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?