Explicitness and nonconnectionist vehicle theories of consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):302-303 (2004)
| Abstract | O'Brien & Opie's connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is heavily dependent on their notion of explicitness as (1) structural and (2) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. These assumptions unnecessarily constrain their position: the authors are forced to find an intrinsic property of patterns that accounts for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. Their candidate property, stability, does not capture this distinction. Yet, I show that we can drop assumptions (1) and (2) and still develop a vehicle theory of consciousness. This alternative is better served by models that incorporate both connectionist and symbolic representations. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesD. C. Dennett & C. F. Westbury (1999). Stability is Not Intrinsic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):153-154.
Dan Lloyd (1999). Consciousness Should Not Mean, but Be. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):158-159.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:127-148.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-48.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
Hugh Clapin (1999). What, Exactly, is Explicitness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):150-151.
Daniel Gilman (1999). Network Stability and Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):155-156.
Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez-Manrique (2008). Thought, Language, and the Argument From Explicitness. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):381–401.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (2004). Vehicle, Process, and Hybrid Theories of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):303-305.
J.Ü, Rgen SchrÖ & der (1999). What has Consciousness to Do with Explicit Representations and Stable Activation Vectors? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):166-167.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads2 ( #232,628 of 549,592 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
