Abstract

Interpretations of Kant today may be divided into two general categories which I will refer to as two-world and two-aspect theories. Briefly, two-world theorists regard Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one between different entities, while two-aspect theorists view the distinction as between different ways in which the same thing can be considered. This difference results in opposing interpretations of Kant's solution to the problem of freedom and determinism. Two-world theorists understand freedom and determinism to be contradictory concepts, but since appearances and things in themselves are held to be ontologically distinct, a thing in itself may be free even if its corresponding appearance is causally determined. Two-aspect theorists may regard freedom and determinism either as consistent concepts that by definition may be ascribed to a single thing only from one point of view or another, or as inconsistent concepts that may nonetheless be ascribed to a single thing from different points of view. ;In this dissertation, I show that while both interpretations are supported by Kant's works, both are also subject to serious philosophical objections. In addition, it is noted that the two-world theory focuses on the metaphysical question posed by the Third Antinomy, whether we are in fact free or determined, while the two-aspect theory is concerned with the epistemological question whether we can, without contradiction, believe ourselves to be both free and determined. ;I propose a third interpretation, the composite view, which adopts the principal features of the two-world and two-aspect theories. According to the composite view, things in themselves and appearances are ontologically distinct, and things in themselves are completely inaccessible to us. Being free and being causally determined are contradictory concepts, but the perspectives from which we attribute them to a thing function in a way similar to time indices to prevent inconsistency of belief. Accordingly, while things in themselves can be free or determined, but not both, our beliefs about them, by way of the appearances that represent them, may ascribe both freedom and determinism of them, although from different perspectives or points of view