David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 68 (68):25-50 (2011)
In this paper, I evaluate the adequacy of various multiverse hypotheses relative to classical theism in explaining the fine tuning of the universe to life and the fine tuning of our life to the universe. I conclude that, despite its rational attractiveness in explaining the fine tuning of the universe to us in a more conclusive and arguably simpler manner than the God hypothesis, due to its failure to explain the continuing fine tuning of us to the universe, we should discard even the explanatorily strongest multiverse hypothesis, what I call the ’maximal multiverse’ hypothesis, and instead believe in the God hypothesis
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References found in this work BETA
Nick Bostrom (2002). Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy. Routledge.
Robin Collins (2003). God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion. Longman Publications.
David L. Dowe, Steve Gardner & and Graham Oppy (2007). Bayes Not Bust! Why Simplicity Is No Problem for Bayesians. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):709 - 754.
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