David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):47-72 (2006)
This paper is dedicated to the formulation of a restricted theory of ontic modality (for example, I do not address questions that arise when modal operators interact with quantifiers, although some of the theoretical developments presented here certainly suggest such questions). As will be seen, notwithstanding its restrictions, the theory has a pleasing richness to it, as well as formal rigor and intuitive satisfactoriness. It also offers an unusual perspective on modality.
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