The Consequence Argument: An Argument For Incompatibilism?
Abstract
According to Joseph Campbell's "No Past Objection" (NPO), popular formal statements of the Consequence Argument are
oddly silent about the freedom status of actors who lack a “remote past,” a time prior to their
birth at which their universe existed but they did not. As such, NPO problematizes the common view that
the Consequence Argument concludes that determinism (perhaps in combination with other things) conflicts with or poses some kind of threat to free will. In this essay, I present a new "explanatory gap objection" to the Consequence Argument which sheds new light on a problem only hinted at in extant work on NPO. As part of this project, I show that NPO misses its mark when targeted at van Inwagen's original logic-text statements of the Consequence Argument, for these arguments must be interpreted given the background assumptions of the classical analytic paradigm in which van Inwagen and his peers were working. However, when the Consequence Argument is unmoored from its original (and now degenerate) paradigm, this argument may be developed as an argument for its original conclusion, but it may also be developed as argument against that view. That is, contemporary statements of the Consequence Argument may used to attack the type of "incompatibilist" conclusion that most philosophers attribute to it.
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