Common Sense, Science, and Scepticism: A Historical Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge

Cambridge University Press (1993)
Can we know anything for certain? There are those who think we can (traditionally labeled the "dogmatists") and those who think we cannot (traditionally labeled the "skeptics"). The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is the great debate between the two. This book is an introductory and historically-based survey of the debate. It sides for the most part with the skeptics. It also develops out of skepticism a third view, fallibilism or critical rationalism, which incorporates an uncompromising realism about perception, science, and the nature of truth.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of
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Call number BD161.M89 1992
ISBN(s) 0521430402
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John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1997). The Validation of Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):62 – 76.
R. M. (1995). Booknotes. Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):403-406.
R. M. (1989). Booknotes. Biology and Philosophy 4 (4):403-406.

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