Oxford University Press (2007)
|Abstract||Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for a piecemeal approach based on a criterion of evidence, a position Roush calls "real anti-realism." Epistemologists and philosophers of science will recognize this as a significant original contribution|
|Keywords||Truth Knowledge, Theory of Evidence|
|Buy the book||$8.00 used (83% off) $13.59 new (70% off) $39.49 direct from Amazon (13% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD171.R72 2007|
|ISBN(s)||0199232938 0199274738 9780199274734 9780199232932|
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