Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science

Oxford University Press (2007)
Abstract
Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for a piecemeal approach based on a criterion of evidence, a position Roush calls "real anti-realism." Epistemologists and philosophers of science will recognize this as a significant original contribution
Keywords Truth  Knowledge, Theory of  Evidence
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $3.65 used (92% off)   $12.26 new (73% off)   $42.75 direct from Amazon (5% off)    Amazon page
Call number BD171.R72 2007
ISBN(s) 0199232938   0199274738   9780199274734   9780199232932
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,738
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
Jonathan Vogel (2007). Subjunctivitis. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.

View all 20 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

18 ( #91,421 of 1,098,828 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #43,265 of 1,098,828 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.