David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2007)
Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for a piecemeal approach based on a criterion of evidence, a position Roush calls "real anti-realism." Epistemologists and philosophers of science will recognize this as a significant original contribution
|Keywords||Truth Knowledge, Theory of Evidence|
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|Buy the book||$3.97 used (97% off) $13.13 new (75% off) $45.04 direct from Amazon (12% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD171.R72 2007|
|ISBN(s)||0199232938 0199274738 9780199274734 9780199232932|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
Jonathan Vogel (2007). Subjunctivitis. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
Marc Alspector-Kelly (2011). Why Safety Doesn't Save Closure. Synthese 183 (2):127-142.
Nancy Cartwright (2009). Evidence-Based Policy: What's to Be Done About Relevance? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (1):127 - 136.
Jonathan Weisberg (2012). The Bootstrapping Problem. Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
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