A Substantive Revision to Firth's Ideal Observer Theory

Stance 3 (1):55-61 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper examines Ideal Observer Theory and uses criticisms of it to lay the foundation for a revised theory first suggested by Jonathan Harrison called Ideal Moral Reaction Theory. Harrison’s Ideal Moral Reaction Theory stipulates that the being producing an ideal moral reaction be dispassionate. This paper argues for the opposite: an Ideal Moral Reaction must be performed by a passionate being because it provides motivation for action and places ethical decision-making within human grasp.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,503

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ideal Observer Theories in Aesthetics.Stephanie Ross - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (8):513-522.
Relativising the ideal observer theory.Charles Taliaferro - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):123-138.
Ethical relativism and the ideal observer.B. C. Postow - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1):120-121.
The Moral Sentiments of the Ideal Observer.Kurt Wesley Norlin - 1996 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
The Mind of the Historian.Bruce Kuklick - 1969 - History and Theory 8 (3):313-331.
Some comments on professor Firth's ideal observer theory.Jonathan Harrison - 1956 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 17 (2):256-262.
Some comments on the 'ideal observer'.John-D. Bailiff - 1964 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24:423-428.
Tragedies of non-ideal theory.Robert Jubb - 2012 - European Journal of Political Theory 11 (3):229-246.
Beardsley, Firth and the ideal observer theory.Richard Garner - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (4):618-623.
The environmental ethics of the ideal observer.Charles Taliaferro - 1988 - Environmental Ethics 10 (3):233-250.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-02

Downloads
28 (#564,813)

6 months
10 (#260,375)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references