What is it like to like?

Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):743-765 (2006)
The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a "pleasure sensation" - for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's "feeling episode" theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations
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    Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
    Warren S. Quinn (1968). Pleasure -- Disposition or Episode? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (June):578-86.

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