David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):157-173 (2006)
Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can playa justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differencesamong various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts
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References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (2002). Sellars and the "Myth of the Given&Quot;. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):69-86.
Jay F. Rosenberg (2004). RTSH)," Red Triangles and Speckled Hens: Critical Notice of BonJour and Sosa on Epistemic Justification. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12:463 - 77.
Wilfrid Sellars (1981). Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process: The Carus Lectures of Wilfrid Sellars. The Monist 64:3-90.
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). Science, Perception, and Reality. New York, Humanities Press.
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1973). Givenness and Explanatory Coherence. Journal of Philosophy 70 (October):612-624.
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