Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (1):1-23 (2001)
|Abstract||It is agreed by most scholars that the Stoics were compatibilists regarding the relation between responsibility and determinism. On this view, the Stoics depart from two other positions. Unlike some eliminative determinists — labelled in modern discussions “hard-determinists”, but already active in Antiquity — they assert that, despite determinism, there are things that “depend on us”, or are : things for which we are genuinely responsible and for which, therefore, we may justifiably be praised or blamed. But the Stoics also depart from the libertarian or “anti-determinist” 2 a position championed by the Epicureans in the early Hellenistic period and by Alexander of Aphrodisias on behalf of the Peripatetics, towards the end of the second century AD. Unlike the libertarian, who agrees on the incompatibility alleged by the hard-determinist, but preserves responsibility by rejectin necessitation, the Stoics preserve both responsibility and necessitation.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Andreas Graeser (1972). Plotinus and the Stoics. Leiden,Brill.
Luis Xavier López-Farjeat (2007). Determinism and Free Will in Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic Tradition. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:161-177.
Saul Smilansky (2003). Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness. Philosophical Studies 115 (3):257-82.
Gretchen J. Reydams-Schils (2005). The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection. University of Chicago Press.
Catherine Atherton (1993). The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge University Press.
Susanne Bobzien (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
John Sellars (2012). Stoics Against Stoics In Cudworth's A Treatise of Freewill. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):935-952.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2002). Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism? Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #17,289 of 556,909 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,122 of 556,909 )
How can I increase my downloads?