Review: What's so Bad about Overdetermination? [Book Review]

Abstract
The intimate relationship between X and Y consists in the existence of (metaphysically) necessary truths correlating their occurrences/existences/instantiations. E would be in some sense “overdetermined” if caused by both X and Y.2 Some philosophers say this would be bad, that this cannot or does not happen, that we should construct theories ruling it out, at least in certain cases.3 But why? Given the necessary truths correlating objects and their parts, objects and events concerning those objects, physical and supervenient mental properties, and so on, X and Y do both seem to be causes of E. Should we say that a baseball..
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00321.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,037
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Justin Tiehen (2015). Explaining Causal Closure. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). From Nihilism to Monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):175 – 191.
Michael J. Raven (2015). Fundamentality Without Foundations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3).

View all 37 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

88 ( #50,186 of 1,934,364 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

18 ( #32,665 of 1,934,364 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.