Abstract
Often, an unconditional basic income (UBI) is seen as a means for reducing economic inequality.
For many of its proponents, UBI is both just and efficient, which potentially makes it an effective means of redistribution. Among other reasons, this has led egalitarian theorists to view UBI as part of an egalitarian ideal society. However, this assessment mostly includes only immediate distributive implications of an implementation of UBI. From the perspective of egalitarian ideal theory, however, long-term distributive implications of institutional designs are relevant as well. Especially, with respect to UBI, a proper investigation of its longterm political effects is lacking: Therefore, we need to investigate the long-term political stability of UBI. In this paper, I derive hypotheses regarding long-term political support for different variants of UBI by employing mechanisms of ‘policy feedback’. In addition, the article contributes to broader methodological debates within political theory by showing that ideal-theoretical approaches can be fruitful for practical questions.