Philosophia 36 (1):141-150 (2008)
|Abstract||Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jacob Ross (2009). Should Kantians Be Consequentialists? Ratio 22 (1):126-135.
Iain Law (1999). Rule-Consequentialism's Dilemma. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):263-276.
Robert Guay (2005). A Refutation of Consequentialism. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):348-362.
Brad Hooker (2000). Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Leonard Kahn (2013). Rule Consequentialism and Disasters. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
Richard Arneson (2005). Sophisticated Rule Consequentialism: Some Simple Objections. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):235–251.
Brad Hooker (1990). Rule-Consequentialism. Mind 99 (393):67-77.
Christopher Woodard (2008). A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):247 - 261.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #46,330 of 722,707 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,707 )
How can I increase my downloads?