Abstract

In the article, I analyze Georg Simmel’s essay on individual law and summarize his criticism of the concept of a universal moral law, which was developed by Immanuel Kant. Simmel identifies two ways of conceptualizing the concept of a moral law: as universal, referring to the regulation of the actions of all rational beings, and as individual, including a specific acting person in his integrity and connection with the world, which is, at the same time, absolute only for him. Kant became the personification of the first method for Simmel; Simmel put forward the second method as an alternative to the first. The central characteristic of law for Simmel is its integrity and individuality, not rationality and universality. If Kant understands the moral law through a distraction from personal characteristics and inclinations in favor of impersonal norms that operate for all rational beings, then, for Simmel, the moral law manifests itself as an integral and individual human act, in which the flow of life manifests itself in the whole. Simmel insists that the idea of Kant’s universal law overlooks the very es-sence of moral obligation, which can only be individual, since only in an individual form life manifests itself – a single source of both the real and the proper. The article ends with a criticism of Simmel’s example of an individual law, which, as I show, not only contradicts a number of Simmel’s statements made earlier, but also demonstrates the undeveloped nature of his concept as a whole, namely: Simmel’s insensitivity to the distinction between integrity and totality as well as disregard for the figure of the Other.