What Objective Consequentialism Must Be Like
| Abstract | Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true.2 They claim: If indeterminism is true, then objective probabilities used to map such indeterminacies must be utilized by objective consequentialist moral theories; however, if determinism is true, probabilities play no role in objective consequentialist theorizing. I beg to differ. Assume determinism is true and I will show you that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic—and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. In this way, I hope to shed some light upon the nature of objective consequentialism. Here’s my case. Consequentialist normative theories can be classified into two groups: subjective and objective. Subjective consequentialist theories might be characterized as those in which an agent’s beliefs concerning the possible consequences of an alternative (including perhaps: their likeliness to obtain should the alternative be performed, their intrinsic value, etc.) play a prominent role in determining that alternative’s normative.. | |||||||||
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Diane Jeske (2001). Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
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Vuko Andrić (2013). Objective Consequentialism and the Licensing Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):547-566.
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Frances Howard-Snyder (1997). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 9 (02):241-248.
JEAN-PAUL VESSEL (2008). The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism. Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.
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