What Objective Consequentialism Must Be Like
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true.2 They claim: If indeterminism is true, then objective probabilities used to map such indeterminacies must be utilized by objective consequentialist moral theories; however, if determinism is true, probabilities play no role in objective consequentialist theorizing. I beg to differ. Assume determinism is true and I will show you that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic—and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. In this way, I hope to shed some light upon the nature of objective consequentialism. Here’s my case. Consequentialist normative theories can be classified into two groups: subjective and objective. Subjective consequentialist theories might be characterized as those in which an agent’s beliefs concerning the possible consequences of an alternative (including perhaps: their likeliness to obtain should the alternative be performed, their intrinsic value, etc.) play a prominent role in determining that alternative’s normative..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Diane Jeske (2001). Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
Edmund Henden (2007). Restrictive Consequentialism and Real Friendship. Ratio 20 (2):179–193.
Onora O'neill (2004). Consequences for Non-Consequentialists. Utilitas 16 (1):1-11.
Vuko Andrić (2013). Objective Consequentialism and the Licensing Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):547-566.
Erik Carlson (1999). The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 11 (01):91-96.
Mozaffar Qizilbash (1999). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism: A Comment. Utilitas 11 (01):97-105.
Scott Forschler (2009). Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism. Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
Frances Howard-Snyder (1997). The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism. Utilitas 9 (02):241-248.
JEAN-PAUL VESSEL (2008). The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism. Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads11 ( #142,081 of 1,099,914 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?