David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004)
Joel Feinberg observed that ‘moral responsibility… is a subject about which we are all confused.’ (1970: 37) Perhaps nowhere is this confusion more evident than in our understandings of praise and blame. This entry will contrast three influential philosophical accounts of our everyday practices of praise and blame, in terms of how they might be justified. On the one hand, a broadly Kantian approach sees responsibility for actions as relying on forms of self control that point back to the idea of free will. On this account praise and blame are justified because a person freely chooses her actions. Praise and blame respond to the person as the chooser of her deed; they recognise her dignity as a rational agent, as Kantians tend to put it. This approach sharply contrasts with two further ways of thinking about the issues. One is utilitarian, where praise and blame are justified in terms of their social benefits. Another, more complex approach is roughly Aristotelian. This approach situates practices of praise and blame in terms of our on going relationships with one another. This approach stresses the importance of mutual accountability, moral education , and assessments of character in terms of the many vices and virtues.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Neal Judisch (2007). Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism and the Consequences of Belief. Journal of Ethics 11 (4):357 - 375.
Michael McKenna & Aron Vadakin (2008). George Sher,In Praise of Blame:In Praise of Blame. Ethics 118 (4):751-756.
Barbara Houston (1992). In Praise of Blame. Hypatia 7 (4):128 - 147.
Frank Hindriks (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.
Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
Angela M. Smith (2008). Character, Blameworthiness, and Blame: Comments on George Sher's in Praise of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):31 - 39.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #23,654 of 1,096,862 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #273,368 of 1,096,862 )
How can I increase my downloads?