Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):137-142 (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Add categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.2307/2107333

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,438

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality.Andrew Woodfield (ed.) - 1982 - New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thought and Object, Essays on Intentionality.Andrew Brennan - 1986 - Noûs 20 (1):92-102.
On specifying the contents of thoughts.Andrew Woodfield - 1982 - In Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality.Edward P. Stabler - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):632.
"Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality" edited by Andrew Woodfield. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):137.
Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality.J. M. Howarth - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (134):81-83.
To think is to have something in one’s thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One’s Thought.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
On the ascription of content.Stephen P. Stich - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 153-206.
According to Fodor, beliefs (and I shall take these as exemplary) involve relations to internal representations: to believe that p is to be in a certain relation to some internal state s which represents.Colin McGinn - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207.
The objects of intentionality.Colin McGinn - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
On the thesis of intentionality.Albert Flores - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (3-4):501-514.
"De re" belief and methodological solipsism.Kent Bach - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kasimir Twardowski on the content of presentations.John Tienson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):485-499.
Speaking Wordly: An Adverbial View of Representation.Steven Frederick Geisz & Geisz Steven - 2000 - Dissertation, Duke University

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-23

Downloads
5 (#1,519,079)

6 months
3 (#992,575)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references