Abstract

Recently, scholars have turned to probability analysis to assess the rationality of belief in God, partly due to the emphasis of probability calculations in assessing the evidential problem of evil. William Rowe concludes that it is more probable that God does not exist than that he does, given the existence of horrendous evils and the fact that no know goods justify God in permitting any of these evils. The strength of his argument is that we do not need to determine whether there are, in fact, any justifying conditions in order to see the implications of the existence of horrendous evils for the probability of the existence of God. Rowe give an analogy to demonstrate that the mere discovery that no known reasons justify these evils shows it is probable that God does not exist. However, as it turns out, many of our intuitions conflict with probability calculus. Furthermore it is difficult to set up problems that can be effectively dealt with using probability calculus, even when it is used correctly. I illustrate this using the argument that Rowe presents and the analogy he offers to support it. First, I show how our intuitions can go astray, then I explain how Rowe’s argument is supposed to operate, and finally, I argue that it is actually of little or no help in guiding us in our beliefs.