Moral Responsibility and Motivating Reasons: On the Epistemic Condition for Moral Blameworthiness

Dissertation, University of Auckland (2021)
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Abstract

In response to the radical view that moral blameworthiness entails full awareness of wrongdoing, I proposed a rival view that avoids the radical view’s counter-intuitive implication that blameworthiness is hard to find. I argued that blameworthiness requires only partial awareness of wrongdoing, and I provided an original account of what those partial awareness conditions are.

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Thomas A. Yates
Massey University

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