Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition

Oxford University Press (2017)

Authors
Philip Robichaud
VU University Amsterdam
Jan Willem Wieland
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars, and it is high time for a full volume on the topic. The chapters in this volume address the following central questions. Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one’s culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one’s action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one’s quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
Keywords responsibility  ignorance  knowledge  blameworthiness  epistemic condition  quality of will  reasonable expectation  excuse
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Reprint years 2017
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ISBN(s) 9780198779667   0198779666
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The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Is Ignorance of Climate Change Culpable?Philip Robichaud - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (5):1409-1430.
Negligence: Its Moral Significance.Santiago Amaya - forthcoming - In Manuel Vargas & John M. Doris (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology.
How Much Should a Person Know? Moral Inquiry & Demandingness.Anna Hartford - 2019 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 6 (1):41-63.

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