A statistical learning approach to a problem of induction

Abstract

At its strongest, Hume's problem of induction denies the existence of any well justified assumptionless inductive inference rule. At the weakest, it challenges our ability to articulate and apply good inductive inference rules. This paper examines an analysis that is closer to the latter camp. It reviews one answer to this problem drawn from the VC theorem in statistical learning theory and argues for its inadequacy. In particular, I show that it cannot be computed, in general, whether we are in a situation where the VC theorem can be applied for the purpose we want it to.

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Kino Zhao
Simon Fraser University

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References found in this work

The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.

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