Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Essential vs. Accidental Properties" by Teresa Robertson Ishii and Philip Atkins
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Adams, R., 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26. (Scholar)
- Bennett, D., 1969, “Essential Properties”, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 487–499. (Scholar)
- Bennett, K., 2004, “Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 118: 339–371. (Scholar)
- Brody, B., 1967, “Natural Kinds and Real Essences”, Journal of Philosophy, 64: 431–446. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Why Settle for Anything Less than Good Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism”, Noûs, 7: 352–365. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, B. and J. Salerno, 2007a, “Why Counterpossibles Are Non-Trivial”, The Reasoner, 1.1: 5–6. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007b, “A Counterfactual Account of Essence”, The Reasoner, 1.4: 4–5. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Remarks on Counterpossibles”, Synthese, 190: 639–660. (Scholar)
- Burke, M., 1994, “Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle”, Journal of Philosophy, 91: 129–139. (Scholar)
- Carnap, R., 1956, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (second edition), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, R., 1968, “Some Remarks on Essentialism”,Journal of Philosophy, 65: 615–626. (Scholar)
- Chandler, H., 1976, “Plantinga and the Contingently Impossible”, Analysis, 36: 106–109. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1967, “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”, Noûs, 1: 1–8. (Scholar)
- Cohen, S., 1978, “Essentialism in Aristotle”, Review of Metaphysics, 31: 387–405. (Scholar)
- Copi, I., 1954, “Essence and Accident”, Journal of Philosophy, 51: 706–719. (Scholar)
- Correia, F., 2007, “(Finean) Essence and (Priorean) Modality”, Dialectica, 61: 63–84. (Scholar)
- Cowling, S., 2013, “The Modal View of Essence”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43: 248–266. (Scholar)
- Della Rocca, M., 1996a, “Essentialism: Part 1”,
Philosophical Books, 37: 1–13. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996b, “Essentialism: Part 2”,
Philosophical Books, 37: 81–89. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996c, “Essentialists and
Essentialism”, Journal of Philosophy, 93:
186–202. (Scholar)
- Denby, D., 2014, “Essence and Intrinsicality”, in Companion to Intrinsic Properties, R. Francescotti (ed.), Berlin: De Gruyter, 87–109. (Scholar)
- Dunn, J. M., 1990, “Relevant Predications 3: Essential Properties”, in Truth or Consequences, J. M. Dunn and A. Gupta (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, 77–95. (Scholar)
- Fine, K., 1994, “Essence and Modality: The Second
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture”, Philosophical
Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995. “Senses of Essence”, in Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, W. Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Varieties of Necessity”, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002, 253–281. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Response to Fabrice Correia”, Dialectica, 61: 85–88. (Scholar)
- Forbes, G., 1983, “Thisness and Vagueness”, Synthese, 54: 253–259. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Two Solutions to Chisholm’s
Paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 46:
171–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986 “In Defense of Absolute Essentialism”, in French et al. 1986, 3–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Worlds and States of Affairs: How Similar Can They Be?”, in Language, Truth, and Ontology, K. Mulligan (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 118–132. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Essentialism”, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 515–533. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Origins and Identities”,
in Individuals, Essence, and Identity, A. Bottani et al.
(eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 319–340. (Scholar)
- French, P., T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), 1986, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Gendler, T. and J. Hawthorne (eds.), 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. (Scholar)
- Gorman, M., 2005, “The Essential and the Accidental”, Ratio, 18: 276–289. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. and T. Gendler, 2000 “Origin Essentialism: The Arguments Reconsidered”, Mind, 109: 285–298. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, D., 1979, “Transworld Heir Lines”, in The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, M. Loux (ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 88–109. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Opacity”, in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (eds.), La Salle: Open Court, 229–289. (Scholar)
- Kment, B., 2014, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity”, in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel; page references to reprint in Kripke 1980. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; expanded version of Kripke 1972. (Scholar)
- Leech, J., 2018, “Essence and Mere Necessity”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82: 309–332. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1968, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. (Scholar)
- –––, 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Livingstone-Banks, J., 2017, “In Defence of Modal Essentialism”, Inquiry, 60: 816–838. (Scholar)
- Loux, M. (ed.), 1979, The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 2008, “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence”, Royal Institute of Philosophical Supplements, 62: 23–48. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J., 1974, “De What Re Is De
Re Modality?”, Journal of Philosophy, 71:
551–561. (Scholar)
- Mackie, P., 2006, How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Marcus, R. B., 1967, “Essentialism in Modal Logic”, Noûs, 1: 91–96. (Scholar)
- Matthews, G., 1990, “Aristotelian Essentialism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50 (supplement): 251–262. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C., 1976, “On the Necessity of Origin”, Journal of Philosophy, 73: 127–135. (Scholar)
- McKay, T., 1986, “Against Constitutional Sufficiency Principles”, in French et al. 1986, 295–304. (Scholar)
- Michels, R., 2019, “On How (Not) to Define Modality in Terms of Essence”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 1015–1033. (Scholar)
- Moore, G., 1922, “Internal and External Relations”, in
Philosophical Studies, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co.;
reprinted (1993) in G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, T. Baldwin
(ed.), London: Routledge, 79–105. (Scholar)
- Noonan, H., 1983, “The Necessity of Origin”, Mind, 92: 1–20. (Scholar)
- Noonan, H., 1991, “Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity, and Abelardian Predicates”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 183–193. (Scholar)
- Oderberg, D., 2007, Real Essentialism, New York and London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Parsons, T., 1967, “Grades of Essentialism in Quantified Modal Logic”, Noûs, 1: 181–191. (Scholar)
- Paul, L., 2004, “The Context of Essence”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 170–184. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Prior, A., 1957, Time and Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of
‘Meaning’”, in Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science VII: Language, Mind and Knowledge, K.
Gunderson (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; reprinted
(1975) in Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume
2, 215–271. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1943, “Notes on Existence and Necessity”, Journal of Philosophy, 40: 113–127. (Scholar)
- –––, 1947, “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 43–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953a, “Reference and
Modality”, in From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press; reprinted with changes in Quine 1980,
139–159. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953b, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement”, Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy, Brussels, 1953, Volume 14, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing; reprinted in Quine 1976, 158–176. (Scholar)
- –––, 1956, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 53: 177–187; reprinted in Quine 1976, 185–196. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (revised and enlarged edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, From a Logical Point of View (revised second edition), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Rea, M., 2000, “Constitution and Kind Membership”, Philosophical Studies, 97: 169–193. (Scholar)
- Rea, M. (ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: A Reader, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Scholar)
- Robertson, T., 1998, “Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism”, Mind, 107: 729–749. (Scholar)
- Rohrbaugh, G., and L. deRosset, 2004, “A New Route to the Necessity of Origin”, Mind, 113: 705–725. (Scholar)
- Romero, C., 2019, “Modality is not Explainable by Essence”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 69: 121–141. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N., 1979, “How Not to Derive Essentialism
from the Theory of Reference” Journal of Philosophy,
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- –––, 1981, Reference and Essence, Princeton: Princeton University Press (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism, P. French et al. (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 75–120; reprinted in Salmon 2005, 273–344. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987/1988, “How to Measure the Standard Metre”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 88: 193–217. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “The Logic of What Might Have Been”, Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Naming, Necessity, and Beyond”, Mind, 112: 475–492; reprinted in Salmon 2005, 377–397. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Reference and Essence (second edition with added appendices), Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2004, “Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 92–102. (Scholar)
- Sidelle, A., 1989, Necessity, Essence, and Individuation, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Skiles, A., 2015, “Essence in Abundance”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 100–112. (Scholar)
- Smullyan, A., 1947, Review of Quine’s “The Problem of
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- –––, 1948, “Modality and Description”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 13: 31–37. (Scholar)
- Soames, S., 2011, “Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility”, in Saul Kripke, A. Berger (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Steward, S., 2015, “Ya Shouldn’ta Couldn’ta
Wouldn’ta”, Synthese, 192: 1909–1921. (Scholar)
- Sullivan, M., 2017, “Are There Essential Properties?
No”, in Current Controversies in Metaphysics, E. Barnes
(ed.), New York and London: Routledge, 45–61. (Scholar)
- Teller, P., 1975, “Essential Properties: Some Problems and Conjectures”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 233–248. (Scholar)
- Torza, A., 2015, “Speaking of Essence”, Philosophical Quarterly, 65: 754–771. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P., 1998, “Modal Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wildman, N., 2013, “Modality, Sparsity, and Essence”, Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 760–782. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Against the Reduction to Modality to Essence”, Synthese, first online 05 January 2018. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1667-6 (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1987, “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 84: 293–314. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Essentialism”, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge, 417–422. (Scholar)
- Zalta, E., 2006, “Essence and Modality”, Mind, 115: 659–693. (Scholar)
- Zylstra, J., 2019, “Essence, Necessity, and Definition”, Philosophical Studies, 176: 339–350. (Scholar)