K. R. Popper distinguished between two main uses of logic, the demonstrational one, in mathematical proofs, and the derivational one, in the empirical sciences. These two uses are governed by the following methodological constraints: in mathematical proofs one ought to use minimal logical means (logical minimalism), while in the empirical sciences one ought to use the strongest available logic (logical maximalism). In this paper I discuss whether Popper’s critical rationalism is compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences, (...) given the condition of logical maximalism. Apparently, if one ought to use the strongest logic in the empirical sciences, logic would remain immune to criticism and, thus, non-revisable. I will show that critical rationalism is theoretically compatible with a revision of logic in the empirical sciences. However, a question that remains to be clarified by the critical rationalists is what kind of evidence would lead them to revise the system of logic that underlies a physical theory, such as quantum mechanics? Popper’s falsificationist methodology will be compared with the recently advocated extension of the abductive methodology from the empirical sciences to logic by T. Williamson, since both of them arrive at the same conclusion concerning the status of classical logic. (shrink)

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with non-normal interpretations of logical connectives.

Vann McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the propositional logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. The main assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. (...) I show that this assumption does not hold for the class of models of classical propositional logic. In particular, I show that the existence of non-normal models for negation undermines McGee’s argument. (shrink)

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...) the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry. (shrink)

The categoricity problem for a system of logic reveals an asymmetry between the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic resources of that logic. In particular, it reveals prima facie that the proof-theoretic instruments are insufficient for matching the envisaged model-theory, when the latter is already available. Among the proposed solutions for solving this problem, some make use of new proof-theoretic instruments, some others introduce new model-theoretic constrains on the proof-systems, while others try to use instruments from both sides. On the proof-theoretical side, (...) two main approaches for solving the categoricity problem for propositional classical logic consist in the enforcement of the formal systems of this logic by introducing rules of inference of a new kind. A multiple-conclusions logic allows rules of inference with more than one conclusion, while a bilateralist system contains rules of inference formulated in terms of assertion and rejection. Both these approaches reveal interesting formal features of logical reasoning. This paper analyses some of the advantages and limitations of these two approaches as solutions for a full formalization of logic, i.e., for a categorical formalization. (shrink)

This paper is a short introduction to Carnap’s writings on semantics with an emphasis on the transition from the syntactic period to the semantic one. I claim that one of Carnap’s main aims was to investigate the possibility of the symmetry between the syntactic and the semantic methods of approaching philosophical problems, both in logic and in the philosophy of science. This ideal of methodological symmetry could be described as an attempt to obtain categorical logical systems, i.e., systems that allow (...) only the intended semantical interpretation. (shrink)

We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.

Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...) problem is generated by the finite nature of the standard calculi and one direction in which it can be solved is to strengthen the deductive systems by adding infinitary rules (such as the ω-rule), i.e., to construct a full formalization. Another main direction is to provide a natural semantics for the standard rules of inference, i.e., a semantics for which these rules are categorical. My aim in this paper is to analyze some recent approaches for solving the categoricity problem and to argue that a logical inferentialist should accept the infinitary rules of inference for the first order quantifiers, since our use of the expressions “all” and “there is” leads us beyond the concrete and finite reasoning, and human beings do sometimes employ infinitary rules of inference in their reasoning. (shrink)

Starting from certain metalogical results, I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and necessary. Afterwards, I formulate two arguments for the idea that first-order logical truths are also analytic, namely, I first argue that there is a conceptual connection between aprioricity, necessity, and analyticity, such that aprioricity together with necessity entails analyticity; then, I argue that the structure of natural deduction systems for FOL displays the analyticity of its truths. Consequently, each philosophical approach to these (...) truths should account for this evidence, i.e., that first-order logical truths are a priori, necessary, and analytic, and it is my contention that the semantic account is a better candidate. (shrink)

A review of the volume that brings together K.R. Popper's writings on deductive logic and its foundations. I emphasize Popper's inferentialist position in his earlier articles and Carnap's influence on many of his logical ideas (an interesting letter from Carnap to Popper is also summarised in the review).

The problem analysed in this paper is whether we can gain knowledge by using valid inferences, and how we can explain this process from a model-theoretic perspective. According to the paradox of inference (Cohen & Nagel 1936/1998, 173), it is logically impossible for an inference to be both valid and its conclusion to possess novelty with respect to the premises. I argue in this paper that valid inference has an epistemic significance, i.e., it can be used by an agent to (...) enlarge his knowledge, and this significance can be accounted in model-theoretic terms. I will argue first that the paradox is based on an equivocation, namely, it arises because logical containment, i.e., logical implication, is identified with epistemological containment, i.e., the knowledge of the premises entails the knowledge of the conclusion. Second, I will argue that a truth-conditional theory of meaning has the necessary resources to explain the epistemic significance of valid inferences. I will explain this epistemic significance starting from Carnap’s semantic theory of meaning and Tarski’s notion of satisfaction. In this way I will counter (Prawitz 2012b)’s claim that a truth-conditional theory of meaning is not able to account the legitimacy of valid inferences, i.e., their epistemic significance. (shrink)

A system of logic usually comprises a language for which a model-theory and a proof-theory are defined. The model-theory defines the semantic notion of model-theoretic logical consequence (⊨), while the proof-theory defines the proof- theoretic notion of logical consequence (or logical derivability, ⊢). If the system in question is sound and complete, then the two notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent. The concept of full formalization is a more restrictive one and requires in addition the preservation of the standard (...) meanings of the logical terms in all the admissible interpretations of the logical calculus, as it is proof-theoretically defined. Although classical first-order logic is sound and complete, its standard formalizations fall short to be full formalizations since they allow non-intended interpretations. This fact poses a challenge for the logical inferentialism program, whose main tenet is that the meanings of the logical terms are uniquely determined by the formal axioms or rules of inference that govern their use in a logical calculus, i.e., logical inferentialism requires a categorical calculus. This paper is the first part of a more elaborated study which will analyze the categoricity problem from its beginning until the most recent approaches. I will first start by describing the problem of a full formalization in the general framework in which Carnap (1934/1937, 1943) formulated it for classical logic. Then, in sections IV and V, I shall discuss the way in which the mathematicians B.A. Bernstein (1932) and E.V. Huntington (1933) have previously formulated and analyzed it in algebraic terms for propositional logic and, finally, I shall discuss some critical reactions Nagel (1943), Hempel (1943), Fitch (1944), and Church (1944) formulated to these approaches. (shrink)

Logical inferentialism maintains that the formal rules of inference fix the meanings of the logical terms. The categoricity problem points out to the fact that the standard formalizations of classical logic do not uniquely determine the intended meanings of its logical terms, i.e., these formalizations are not categorical. This means that there are different interpretations of the logical terms that are consistent with the relation of logical derivability in a logical calculus. In the case of the quantificational logic, the categoricity (...) problem is generated by the finite nature of the standard calculi and one direction in which it can be solved is to strengthen the deductive systems by adding infinitary rules (such as the ω-rule), i.e., to construct a full formalization. Another main direction is to provide a natural semantics for the standard rules of inference, i.e., a semantics for which these rules are categorical. My aim in this paper is to analyze some recent approaches for solving the categoricity problem and to argue that a logical inferentialist should accept the infinitary rules of inference for the first order quantifiers, since our use of the expressions “all” and “there is” leads us beyond the concrete and finite reasoning, and human beings do sometimes employ infinitary rules of inference in their reasoning. (shrink)

The following study presents a concise historical overview of natural philosophy, examining the interpretations of the human psyche and their development up until the contemporary era. The presentation focuses on some of the main theories regarding the nature and functions of the mind, aiming to contrast them with one of the unfulfilled intellectual projects of the Romanian polymath C. Rădulescu-Motru. Specifically, his project aimed to establish a philosophical system addressing the intricacies of the human soul in the context of the (...) scientific advances considered modern at the time–a system he referred to as the new science of the soul. His objective was to provide a comprehensive perspective encompassing all areas of knowledge in order to mitigate their tendency towards determinism, mechanism and biologism, which were spreading from the direction of the natural science. (shrink)

Media increasingly accuse firms of exploiting suppliers, and these allegations often result in lurid headlines that threaten the reputations and therefore business successes of these firms. Neither has the phenomenon of supplier exploitation been investigated from a rigorous, ethical standpoint, nor have answers been provided regarding why some firms pursue exploitative approaches. By systemically contrasting economic liberalism and just prices as two divergent perspectives on supplier exploitation, we introduce a distinction of common business practice and unethical supplier exploitation. Since supplier (...) exploitation is based on power, we elucidate several levels of power as antecedents and investigate the role of ethical climate as a moderator. This study extends Victor and Cullen’s ethical climate matrix according to a supply chain dimension and is summarized in an integrated, conceptual model of five propositions for future theory testing. Results provide a frame of reference for executives and scholars, who can now delineate unethical exploitation and understand important antecedents of the phenomenon better. (shrink)

As recently stakeholders complain about the use of conflict minerals in consumer products that are often invisible to them in final products, firms across industries implement conflict mineral management practices. Conflict minerals are those, whose systemic exploitation and trade contribute to human right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas. Particularly, supply chain managers in the Western world are challenged taking reasonable steps to identify and prevent risks associated with these resources due to the globally dispersed nature of (...) supply chains and the opacity of the origin of commodities. Supply chain due diligence represents a holistic concept to proactively manage supply chains reducing the likelihood of the use of conflict minerals effectively. Based on an exploratory study with 27 semi-structured interviews within five European industries, we provide insights into patterns of implementation, key motivational factors, barriers and enablers, and impacts of SCDD in mineral supply chains. Our results contribute to both theory and practice as we provide first insights to SCDD practices and make recommendations for an industry-wide implementation of SCDD. Altogether, this study provides the basis for future theory testing research in the context of SCDD and conflict mineral management. (shrink)

Le projet de Jean Piaget ne se réduit pas à son œuvre épistémologique. Il prend sa source, dès l'adolescence, dans une volonté de réconcilier la science et la foi. C'est de cette source-là, morale et humaniste, que lui vient son intérêt pour l'éducation. Sa pensée éducative se fonde sur la ferme conviction que la morale est une logique de l'action comme la logique est une morale de la pensée. Il s'ensuit qu'éducation morale et éducation intellectuelle doivent être menées de front, (...) et donc, qu'il faut éduquer la personne entière. Mais l'éducation est ambiguë par essence, selon qu'elle enferme l'enfant dans son égocentrisme intellectuel et la morale conventionnelle ou, au contraire, qu'elle stimule, par une pédagogie appropriée, sa marche vers une plus grande rationalité et une éthique personnelle. Dans de nombreux textes, Piaget explique comment l'école peut aider l'élève, citoyen de demain, à construire sa liberté intérieure, liberté de jugement autant que liberté de conscience. Humaniser l'humanité par l'éducation grâce à l'école, tel est le sens de son engagement - pendant trois décennies - à la tête du Bureau international d'éducation et à l'Unesco. (shrink)

BackgroundAlthough the number of reporting guidelines has grown rapidly, few have gone through an updating process. The STARD statement (Standards for Reporting Diagnostic Accuracy), published in 2003 to help improve the transparency and completeness of reporting of diagnostic accuracy studies, was recently updated in a systematic way. Here, we describe the steps taken and a justification for the changes made.ResultsA 4-member Project Team coordinated the updating process; a 14-member Steering Committee was regularly solicited by the Project Team when making critical (...) decisions. First, a review of the literature was performed to identify topics and items potentially relevant to the STARD updating process. After this, the 85 members of the STARD Group were invited to participate in two online surveys to identify items that needed to be modified, removed from, or added to the STARD checklist. Based on the results of the literature review process, 33 items were presented to the STARD Group in the online survey: 25 original items and 8 new items; 73 STARD Group members (86 %) completed the first survey, and 79 STARD Group members (93 %) completed the second survey.Then, an in-person consensus meeting was organized among the members of the Project Team and Steering Committee to develop a consensual draft version of STARD 2015. This version was piloted in three rounds among a total of 32 expert and non-expert users. Piloting mostly led to rewording of items. After this, the update was finalized. The updated STARD 2015 list now consists of 30 items. Compared to the previous version of STARD, three original items were each converted into two new items, four original items were incorporated into other items, and seven new items were added.ConclusionsAfter a systematic updating process, STARD 2015 provides an updated list of 30 essential items for reporting diagnostic accuracy studies. (shrink)

L'étude plaide pour une théorie critique et pragmatique de la méthodologie juridique, correspondant au modèle libéral et démocratique de la modernité avancée. L'enjeu en question est la meilleure possible justification des jugements juridiques, opérés soit par des organes d'Etat soit par quiconque participe de la discursivité juridique, dans l'espace public démocratique. De la pensée juridique anglo-saxonne jusqu'à la philosophie européenne du droit, l'ouvrage scrute les débats qui s'y développent actuellement, notamment sur les thèmes suivants. Nature et justesse des jugements juridiques, (...) langage juridique, raisonnement judiciaire, interprétation des règles et des principes du droit, raisonnabilité de l'argumentation juridique, production " jurisprudentielle " de normes. La préoccupation sous-jacente de l'auteur est stimulée par le souci que l'on aborde les problèmes graves et explosifs de l'humanité avec un esprit critique attaché à la force du meilleur argument, et non à la suprématie du plus fort. C'est ainsi que l'hypothèse centrale de travail, optée par cet ouvrage, affirme que le problème de la justesse des jugements juridiques est indissolublement lié, en dernière instance, à la question de la légitimité de l'ordre juridique établi. Et la légitimité d'un système juridique et politique moderne se mesure principalement par sa qualité d'instance institutionnelle apéritive aux postulats de justice matérielle... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:William Durant the Younger and Conciliar TheoryConstantin FasoltWilliam Durant the Younger (c. 1266–1330) had a sharp mind, deep familiarity with the law of his times, and the practical experience necessary to understand exactly what was wrong with what he, like others, called “the state of the church.”1 He also had the ability to argue from principles to conclusions and the courage to state his conclusions in public—at least until (...) his superiors taught him to proceed with greater caution. The results were some rather radical ideas which reverberated through the later Middle Ages and beyond. They are contained in a long treatise on the reform of the church (Tractatus Maior), which he submitted to the council of Vienne in 1311, and a shorter one (Tractatus Minor), which he wrote at the council of Vienne while it was still in session and after having had what appears to have been an unpleasant encounter with Pope Clement V. The purpose of this article is to focus on the underlying significance of his ideas for our understanding of the conciliar movement and its place in European history.The significance of Durant’s ideas ought not to be confused with their influence. Influence is the historian’s term for the efficient causality of ideas. Modern science, according to a wide-spread commonplace, has taught us to [End Page 385] focus our attention on efficient causality to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Merely to take the notion of formal or final causality seriously is likely to create bewilderment and misunderstanding. The great interest historians take in tracing influence thus is perhaps a measure of the tribute they pay to modern science, but it is clear neither that such tribute is deserved nor that modern science wants it. That is at least one good reason why it may be worthwhile to deflect attention from whatever efficient causality (influence) Durant’s ideas may have exercised and focus it on their formal and final causes instead—on the questions what they were and where they led.2What, then, were Durant’s ideas? The treatise that he submitted to the council of Vienne in 1311 bristles with all sorts of complexities. But most of these are superficial. At bottom, it was founded on a few straightforward premises. These premises can be stated and counted in different ways, depending on how closely you want to look, the order in which you want to proceed, and the case you want to argue. For the purposes of this article they are best summed up in three propositions.The first was that actions are right only if they conform to the law of the church. There are many questions that would need to be answered in order to make this a workable principle. For example, what, precisely, is the law of the church? Is it limited to the Bible? If so, all of the Bible, including the Mosaic Law, or only parts of the Bible? Does it perhaps include conciliar canons and papal decretals as well? If so, which canons and which decretals? Are such canons and decretals human law or divine law? What is the relation between human law and divine law in the first place? Who decides the meaning of the law in case of doubts or contradictions? What if someone is ignorant of the law? And perhaps most important: how do you verify that conduct does in fact conform to the law? Durant struggled with those questions and with others like them. But none of the practical and theoretical difficulties they raised ever shook his conviction that they could be answered and that the solution was contained in the holy books and the canonical writings transmitted from antiquity. His entire work rests on one simple idea: to act rightly means to act in conformity with the laws established and transmitted from antiquity.3 And to [End Page 386] judge rightly means to judge actions by those laws.4 Those laws were old, good, and true. They were the real authorities; the people who applied them were merely their servants.The second proposition consisted of Durant’s conviction that the world had fallen away from... (shrink)

In his late works, such as “The Road since Structure”, Thomas Kuhn revised his view on the development of scientific knowledge, described as a succession of stages of “normal science” and “extraordinary research” leading to the replacement of one paradigm by another, and proposed a linguistic approach to the advancement of scientific knowledge based on the concepts of conceptual network and lexicon. I believe that Kuhn’s proposal can be used as a heuristic tool for understanding the process of scientific growth, (...) including in psychology. In this regard, C. Rădulescu-Motru’s “Psychology Course” from 1923 is an exemplary case, marking the transition from speculative psychology, based on substantialist Aristotelian concepts, to an empirical psychology, based on experimental research – a program initiated by Franz Brentano and John St. Mill. This course thus crowns the Romanian philosopher’s efforts to develop a scientific lexicon and reinforce the conceptual network specific to psychology, an approach that places him in synchronicity with the Western philosophical and scientific community. (shrink)

Holder of two degrees – one in religious studies (1930) and the other in philosophy (1947), both obtained from the University of Bucharest –, as well as au­thor of significant works covering the two aforementioned fields, Constantin C. Pavel, professor and theologian, imposed himself as a remarkable personality in Romanian re­ligious and philosophical culture. He is well-known for his moral philosophy, referenc­ing human nature and condition, and expertly expressing his opinion on the disastrous impact that modern culture and its (...) civilizational components have on human beings. The current study brings to attention the aspects raised by this approach, specifically the human–culture–religion triad, from the positions of the Orthodox Christian doctrine embraced by Constantin C. Pavel in "Tragedia omului în cultura modernă" [The tragedy of man in modern culture]. (shrink)

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these (...) three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tănăsescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest. (shrink)

In the following research I discuss a number of issues which are fundamental to my understanding of how best to reconstruct past human events from the methodological outlook of a legal historian. Herein one will find an explanation of and justification for the various aspects of the historical method and philosophy I employ in my larger research area involving the Roman Emperor Constantine, the Christian Church, and state sovereignty. I also discuss some lines of intersection between modern day legal actors (...) and historians to show how their common goal of getting to the truth of a question may encourage the former to consider using some of the same hermeneutical tools as the latter. History as a discipline has always been primarily concerned with humans and their actions, and this has been noted by many historians: Marc Bloch and R.G. Collingwood come to mind as being two of the strongest proponents of this dictum. Since the field of human events in the past is so large, I suggest it behooves us, then, not to confine ourselves too narrowly within our investigations concerning the hermeneutical tools we employ in the study of the multivariate ways that humans have acted and existed since their appearance some two-hundred thousand years ago: and to this end I employ Sub specie aeternitatis as my research’s inclusive-contextual raison d'être. This perspective requires an acknowledgment that scholarly observations about the reality of the human condition from other disciplines must be employed in the effort to be as wide-ranging in our research method gathering as the historical method will allow: and thus a number of key contributions from authors in various academic fields will be discussed to highlight the relative importance of their ideas to my own. I will be using examples within my own area of study to engage these ideas and this will better acquaint the reader with how I approach historical data. This discussion will be purposely focused on the foundational ideas upon which my own historical method is based. This will enable the reader to better appreciate how it is that I as a historian come up with suggestions about what it was in history that most likely happened. I conclude that as a historian my highest goal must be to offer an imaginative re-construction of an historical event and its concomitant personages which is based on extant data, but which also must engage in a participatory re-thinking pursuant to the motivations of the characters involved such that the end result can be read as an intelligible whole. (shrink)