What Makes Logical Truths True?

Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272 (2016)
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Abstract

The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control the process of deduction in inquiry, i.e., they are prescriptive for the use of language and thought in inquiry, I argue that logic may, and should, be seen as an instrument or as a way of proceeding (modus procedendi) in inquiry.

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Author's Profile

Constantin C. Brîncuș
Institute of Philosophy and Psychology, Romanian Academy

References found in this work

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The philosophy of logic.Penelope Maddy - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.

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