James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come from it, and according to Sterba, this principle implies that God may not permit significant evils even if that permission would be necessary to secure other, greater goods. By contrast, I argue that the occurrence of significant evils (...) is logically compatible with the existence of a good God because victims of significant evils may themselves reasonably consent to their suffering. In particular, I argue that they may be able to accept their suffering if it turns out that there was no way for God to secure relevant greater goods (or prevent other, greater evils) except by way of allowing their suffering, and God also provides them with other compensating, heavenly comforts. After using this consent-based argument to address Sterba’s logical problem from evil, I briefly consider how this argument may also help address a related evidential problem from evil, which suggests that while it is possible that victims of significant evils would consent to their suffering, it is unlikely that they would do so. While I do not provide a definitive solution to this evidential problem of evil, I highlight one important example of a trade-off that God may need to make that would—along with the provision of compensating, heavenly comforts—potentially persuade victims of significant evils to consent to their suffering. Specifically, I argue that there may be a necessary trade-off that God needs to make between permitting significant evils (on the one hand) and protecting a certain, morally significant form of free will (on the other hand). (shrink)

Focusing on current efforts to persuade the public to comply with Covid-19 best practices, this essay examines what role appeals to religious reasons should (or should not) play in leaders’ attempts to secure followers’ acceptance of group policies in contexts of religious and moral pluralism. While appeals to followers’ religious commitments can be helpful in promoting desirable public health outcomes, they also raise moral concerns when made in the contexts of secular institutions with religiously diverse participants. In these contexts, leaders (...) who appeal to religious reasons as bases of justification for imposing Covid policies may seem to fail to show respect for the autonomy of those who lack the relevant religious commitments, and—especially when a leader herself rejects the religious commitments she makes reference to to persuade others—her appeals to religious reasons may seem to constitute ethically problematic exercises of manipulation. This essay draws on the resources of contemporary political philosophy to analyze and respond to these concerns and concludes that they are not sufficiently well-founded. To the contrary, it contends that there are good moral grounds for leaders to appeal to religious reasons as (partial) bases of justification for why followers should accept Covid policies. In the course of the argument, this essay also highlights how contemporary political theory can enrich discussions about the distinctions between coercion, manipulation, and leadership, and thereby give insight not only into the ethics of leadership but also—at least by the lights of central theories of leadership like that of James MacGregor Burns (1978)—into whether and how appeals to religious reasons can figure into genuine exercises of leadership, in contrast with mere instances of the wielding of social power. (shrink)

Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent like Huck (...) can implicitly appreciate a consideration as a moral reason to φ by presenting it under the light of a particular phenomenologically-mediated mode of presentation: one that presents that consideration via the light of a felt directive force “pointing” towards φ-ing—lending weight to it, or soliciting it—in a particular authoritative way. Thus, I suggest, Huck may be understood on analogy with a young jazz piano virtuoso. As she may appreciate that the G-seventh chord having been played just so constitutes an aesthetic reason for her to ease into the C-major-seventh chord just so by virtue of experiencing the former as pointing or directing her to the latter, so also, I propose, Huck may appreciate the considerations speaking in favor of helping Jim as moral reasons to help Jim by virtue of experiencing them as pointing or directing him to help Jim. The chapter also examines and rejects four alternative proposals for how to account for implicit reasons-appreciation: first, a de re account of appreciation and then three additional accounts of appreciation derived from major theories of mental representation (inferentialist, causal tracking, and functionalist theories). (shrink)

Political liberals argue that religious citizens should exercise religious restraint: they ought, at least as a rule, not to rely directly on religious reasons in public political debates, and should instead draw only from the contents of a ‘reasonable’, secular political conception of justice. Political liberals hold that direct religious reasoners’ who fail to follow this rule fail to be ‘reasonable’ (in a technical sense) and contend that liberal polities may thus dismiss their religiously-motivated objections to otherwise justified democratic laws. (...) However, I argue that political liberals’ own principles of ‘reasonability’ forbid such a dismissal. Those principles themselves, I argue, require liberal polities to offer direct religious reasoners who are reasonable in the basic, colloquial sense of being fair-minded and reciprocitous, deep reasons—that speak to their comprehensive religious doctrines—for why they should accept and reason from a ‘reasonable’, political conception of justice. I call the position which requires such deep justification of a ‘reasonable’, political conception of justice Deep Inclusivism, and draw on the work of Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic political thinker, to help illustrate what a fair-minded, reciprocitous religious reasoner might look like. (shrink)

Political liberals claim that liberal polities may legitimately dismiss the objections of ‘unreasonable’ citizens who resist political liberals’ favored principles of justice and political justification. A growing number of other political philosophers, including post-colonialist theorists, have objected to the resulting insularity of political liberalism. However, political liberals’ insularity also often prevents them from being sensitive or responsive to these critics’ complaints. In this article, I develop a more efficacious internal critique of political liberalism: I show that political liberals’ own core (...) principles of liberal legitimacy sometimes require liberal polities to engage with the objections of those who hold ‘unreasonable’, and even illiberal, views. First, I draw on the work of Sayyid Qutb, an illiberal Islamic political thinker, to argue that – contrary to what political liberals often imply – even ‘unreasonable’, illiberal citizens may be fair-minded: that is, they may be actively concerned to cooperate with others on fair and mutually endorsable terms. Second, I contend that a liberal state’s own core commitment to treating citizens as free and equal requires it to offer fair-minded illiberal citizens like Qutb deep reasons – that don’t presuppose agreement on liberal principles of justice and so can speak to them in the dialectical position they start from – for why they should accept the liberal laws with which the state coerces them to comply. By showing how political liberals’ own commitments oblige them to address even ‘unreasonable’ political perspectives, I open the door to their more robust engagement with their critics, including not only comparative political theorists but also the growing number of illiberal citizens who challenge democratic regimes. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a _(pro tanto)_ _moral duty against dogmatism_: I argue that the _social costs_ of a disagreement can give those who are party to it added moral reasons to reconsider their controversial beliefs and (so) not to be dogmatic. In Sect. 1, I motivate the idea _that_ the social costs of disagreement may give rise to reasons to reconsider our beliefs by considering intuitive examples to that effect. I suggest that some of the stock intuitions (...) that epistemologists of disagreement have depended on to make their arguments are implicitly influenced by social costs that are salient to the disagreements in their cases. In Sect. 2, I respond to a _Practical Objection_ to my argument that political philosophers might be keen to press. According to this objection, the social costs of disagreement do not give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism because we can adequately address those costs just by compromising on how we _act on_ our beliefs in the context of the disagreement. In Sect. 3, I address a contrasting objection to the moral duty against dogmatism that might be pressed by epistemologists, which I term the _Truth Objection._ This objection points out that the social costs of disagreement do nothing to affect the strength of the _evidence _for or against one’s contentious beliefs, and so complains that those who reconsider their beliefs just on account of the social costs of disagreement ‘cave in’ to social pressure in a problematic way. In the course of addressing the Truth Objection, I more carefully explain _how_ the social costs of disagreement give rise to a moral duty against dogmatism by distinguishing between ‘truth-motivated’ and ‘truth-indifferent’ reasons for inquiry. (shrink)

Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement. We lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a (...) different sort of baseline for understanding how obedience to arbitrary requirements could, in principle, be rational. (shrink)

In his seminal Orientalism and Religion, Richard King argues that Western scholars of religion have constructed a conceptual dichotomy between “mysticism” and “rationality” that has caused them to systematically distort the claims and arguments of Eastern thinkers. While King focuses primarily on Western scholarship on the Buddhist and Hindu traditions, this essay shows that his argument can also be extended to apply to Western scholarship on al-Ghazālī, whose sympathy for Sufism and apparent rejection of Greek philosophy has often earned him (...) the reputation of being a champion of Islamic mysticism. I argue that al-Ghazālī transcends the dueling categories of ‘rationality’ and ‘mysticism’ that have been imposed on him by offering a conception of experiential knowledge that retains its roots in the ‘mystical’ Sufi tradition, even while also highlighting the rational merits of experientially-grounded modes of knowing. In particular, I argue that al-Ghazālī shows us how experiential knowledge is both important to providing motivation for rational action and also critical to underwriting persons’ genuine understanding of the evaluative properties of that which is known. (shrink)

Although there are many possible ways of understanding menopause, it is the notion of menopause as hormone deficiency that currently dominates. How is it that this account remains prevalent rather than some alternative understanding of menopause? This question is explored through the employment of a framework informed by both actor network theory and symbolic interactionist studies. The author exploits the common ground shared by these two conceptual approaches to analyze how practices generate and reify particular kinds of knowledge about menopause. (...) The analysis is situated within Australian menopause clinics and explores several key contemporary practices of these clinics to show how the particular understanding of menopause as hormone deficiency is generated and stabilized. The study stresses the knowledge/practice nexus and emphasizes that meanings are not given in advance but are generated through practices. In particular, the focus is on the interactions of the social and the material entities of menopause clinics and how through these interactions the understanding of menopause as hormone deficiency is produced. (shrink)

This article endeavours to contribute to the study of the influence and effect of Deuteronomy in the book of Hebrews. It investigates the possible influence of one of Deuteronomy’s key concepts on Hebrews, namely, the concept of ‘life’. The article starts off by defining the multifaceted concept of ‘life’ in Deuteronomy. This is followed up by combing through the text of Hebrews to identify traces of this concept in the words and arguments that the writer employs. The possible traces found (...) are then investigated intertextually in detail. This includes references to ‘the living God’ (Heb 3:12; 9:14; 10:31; 12:22), God’s ‘living and active’ word (Heb 4:12), ‘the new and living way’ Jesus opened through his death (Heb 10:20) and the command to ‘submit to the Father of spirits and live’ (Heb 12:9). The article concludes by synthesising the findings to discuss whether Hebrews deliberately employs Deuteronomy’s concept of life. (shrink)

Clinical work in Alcohol and Other Drugs has not generally been an area of focus for ethicists. Likewise, ethics is not usually part of Alcohol and Other Drugs training or practice. This means that resources available to Alcohol and Other Drugs clinicians navigating ethical challenges are not widely available. This paper describes a systematic review of literature at the intersection of ethics and clinical practice in Alcohol and Other Drugs. The review will potentially benefit Alcohol and Other Drug practitioners by (...) outlining what resources currently available and will also highlight potential directions for future research. The review searched for all published work in ethics at the intersection with Alcohol and Other Drugs. Searches within academic databases, the World Wide Web, and within journal Tables of Contents identified 18 relevant papers from 1985 onwards. An inductive process of categorisation produced two categories of this literature. The first was codes of ethics, further divided into rule-... (shrink)

Qualitative research is largely dependent on building good interpersonal relations between researcher and participant. This is necessary for generating rich data, while at the same time ensuring respect is maintained between researcher and participant. We argue for a better understanding of researcher–participant relations in research practice. Codes of ethics, although important, do not address these kinds of ethical challenges. Negotiating the ethical relations between researcher and participant is paramount in maintaining ethical rigour in qualitative research. In this paper we propose (...) concepts that can assist in understanding how the ethics of research relations are negotiated in practice; the ‘zone of the untouchable’ from the Danish philosopher, Løgstrup, is combined with the notion of ‘ethical mindfulness’. We argue how and why these concepts in tandem can heighten awareness and offer ways to address the ethically important moments in research. (shrink)

ObjectivesTo investigate the views of Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) members and of researchers concerning the human research ethics review process in Australia.To examine whether there are differences between views of researchers and HREC members.Design and settingRegistrants at the NHMRC Ethics in Human Research Conference held in Canberra in May 2005 were surveyed by anonymous questionnaire comprising 14 questionnaire items and background demographic questions.ResultsOf the 407 registrants, 252 completed the questionnaire (62% response rate). Respondents comprised 219 (87%) HREC members or (...) administrators, and 33 (13%) researchers who were not HREC members. Researchers generally had a less positive attitude to the HREC process than did HREC members. Researchers were less likely to believe that HRECs: make clear and reasonable decisions in an acceptable timeframe; provide informal guidance to researchers; and have the necessary expertise to make appropriate decisions. The largest difference related to relations between researchers and HRECs: 82.5% of HREC members thought relations were good, but only 59.3% of researchers held this view. Despite these differences, both HREC members and researchers held the view that the ethics review process in Australia is working well.ConclusionAlthough our study suggests that both HREC members and researchers are satisfied with the process of human research ethics review in Australia, there are areas of concern that merit further investigation. These include the timeliness and clarity of HREC decisions, the methodological expertise available to HRECs and the basis for HREC decisions. (shrink)

In the introduction to his sermon, the writer of Hebrews suggests that God’s revelation unfolded from his so-called ‘Old Testament’ revelation to his ‘New Testament’ revelation in his Son. By doing a thorough exegesis of Hebrews 1:1–2a, the author’s view of such an unfolding revelation is confirmed. From this conclusion, certain hermeneutical implications of the unfolding of God’s revelation are drawn for believers and scholars today. Among others, it is determined that God’s revelation is progressive, that his revelation in his (...) Son is superior, climactic and final, and that God’s final revelation in his Son can only be understood within the context of his Old Testament revelation, and vice versa.Keywords: Hebrews; Hebrews 1:1-2a; unfolding; revelation; hermeneutics. (shrink)

Strive for peace with everyone? Hebrews 12:14 in perspective. What sounds like a simple exhortation in Hebrews 12:14 has caused a great deal of discussion amongst biblical scholars. Does the writer of Hebrews command his hearers to strive for peace with everyone everywhere, or is he exhorting them to strive for peace with all the members of their faith ommunity? Both interpretations have arguments for and against. The main arguments of both interpretations are the interpretation of the place of this (...) exhortation in Hebrews, the meaning of the preposition μετά + genitive and the nuance of εἰρήνη within this context. This article tries to determine to whom the writer of Hebrews is referring with πάντων in 12:14 by doing thorough exegesis of this verse, and by so doing evaluating biblical scholar’s interpretation of πάντων. From this analysis certain implications are drawn for the first hearersand believers today. (shrink)

Neo-capitalistic approaches to value creation have sometimes developed a bad reputation in terms of sustainability and care for the environment. Yet, there are examples to the contrary emphasising a concern for sustainable capitalism. Our literature synthesis suggests that there is a lack of understanding of the sustainability mechanisms—ways of working helping companies to achieve their leadership in sustainability and maintain it over time. We contribute by addressing this deficiency and specifying four discrete mechanisms which we call the 4S model. Specifically, (...) we apply this model to the cases of two leading exponents of sustainability—Unilever and Patagonia—to explain how companies can operate as forces to change business practice and improve sustainability having regard to people, planet, and profits. (shrink)

In theory, HREC members should use the ethical guidelines in the National Statement on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans as the basis for their decisions, and researchers should design their research in accordance with these guidelines However, very little is known about what researchers and HREC members actually do in practice. In this paper, we report some of the key findings of the study “Human Research Ethics in Practice”, a qualitative interview-based study of health researchers and HREC members (...) in Victoria. The findings shed light on how researchers and HREC members conceptualise ethics, how they use the National Statement, and what deliberative strategies they employ to assess the ethical appropriateness of research studies. The findings also reveal differences and similarities between health researchers’ and HREC members’ perceptions of the roles of HRECs, and point to some sources of misunderstanding and tension. We examine the implications of some of these findings for the ways in which HRECs carry out their task, and research institutions support and promote ethical conduct in research amongst their staff and students. The focus of this study is on health research, but we suggest that the findings are highly relevant to all other research areas where human participants are involved. (shrink)

God’s speech is a prominent theme in the book of Hebrews. A fascinating phenomenon regarding God’s speech, and one that has in my opinion not been adequately explored, is that the writer possibly implies that God created by his word, preserves creation by his word and will consummate creation by his word. This article examines whether the writer indeed had the conviction that God did, does and will do this by his word. This is done by doing grammatico-historical exegesis of (...) Hebrews 11:3, 1:3 and 12:26 and integrating the findings. In so doing, this article contributes to the study of Hebrews’ theology of God’s word. (shrink)

In this article, the background of the phrase 'and live' in Hebrews 12:9 is investigated. Although most scholars are silent on the matter, the majority of those who venture to propose a possible background vaguely refer to Proverbs 6:23b. Only a handful of scholars propose other backgrounds. This article aims to fill this lacuna. The first part of the article gives an overview of the argument of Hebrews 12:9 in its context to determine a baseline for the interpretation of the (...) phrase 'and live'. This is followed by investigating eight possible backgrounds of the phrase and weighing arguments for and against each proposal. Next, the article integrates the findings and concludes that, of all the proposed backgrounds, Deuteronomy 8:1-5 fits the best. If this is correct, the writer uses the phrase 'and live' in Hebrews 12:9 to positively exhort his hearers to live life as their heavenly Father intended it, now up to eternity, by wholeheartedly obeying his revelation in his Son. (shrink)

Background: Visual technologies are central to youth culture and are often the preferred communication means of adolescents. Although these tools can be beneficial in fostering relations, adolescents’ use of visual technologies and social media also raises ethical concerns. Aims: We explored how school public health nurses identify and resolve the ethical challenges involved in the use of visual technologies in health dialogues with adolescents. Research design: This is a qualitative study utilizing data from focus group discussions. Participants and research context: (...) We conducted focus group discussions using two semi-structured discussion guides with seven groups of public health nurses working in Norwegian school health services. The data were collected during January and October 2016. Discussions were audio recorded, transcribed, and coded into themes and subthemes using systematic text condensation. Ethical considerations: The leader of the public health nursing service who agreed to provide access for the study and the Norwegian Center for Research Data that reviewed and approved the study. All participants gave informed consent. Findings: In adolescents’ use of visual materials with public health nurses, ethical concerns were raised regarding suicide ideations, socially unacceptable content, violation of privacy, and presentations of possible child neglect. The nurses utilized their professional knowledge and experience when identifying and navigating these ethical dilemmas; they resolved ethical uncertainties through peer discussion and collaboration with fellow nurses and other professionals. Discussion: We discussed the findings in light of Annemarie Mol’s interpretation of the ethics of care. Mol expands the notion of ethical care to include the action of technologies. Conclusion: Although the increasing use of visual technologies offered benefits, school nurses faced ethical challenges in health dialogues with adolescents. To address and navigate these ethical issues, they relied on their experience and caring practices based on their professional ethics. Uncertainties were resolved through peer dialogue and guidance. (shrink)

Visual research is a fast-growing interdisciplinary field. The flexibility and diversity of visual research methods are seen as strengths by their adherents, yet adoption of such approaches often requires researchers to negotiate complex ethical terrain. The digital technological explosion has also provided visual researchers with access to an increasingly diverse array of visual methodologies and tools that, far from being ethically neutral, require careful deliberation and planning for use. To explore these issues, the Symposium on Exploring Ethical Frontiers of Visual (...) Methods was held at the University of Melbourne, Australia, on 4 March 2014. The symposium was hosted by the Visual Research Collaboratory, a consortium of Australian and Canadian visual researchers, with support from Melbourne Social Equity Institute, University of Melbourne. The symposium represented the culmination of a process to develop a resource outlining principles of ethical practice for visual researchers and ethics committee members, the Guidelines for Ethical Visual Research Methods, which were launched at the event. The Guidelines present a framework for considering ethical matters in visual research, distinguishing six groups of issues united by an overarching theme: confidentiality; minimizing harm; consent; fuzzy boundaries; authorship and ownership; and representation and audiences. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward the view that emotions have a legitimate and important role in health professional ethics education. This paper draws upon our experience of running a narrative ethics education programme for ethics educators from a range of healthcare disciplines. It describes the way in which emotions may be elicited in narrative ethics teaching and considers the appropriate role of emotions in ethics education for health professionals. We argue there is a need for a pedagogical framework to (...) productively incorporate the role of emotions in health professional ethics teaching. We suggest a theoretical basis for an ethics pedagogy that integrates health professional emotions in both the experience and the analysis of ethical practice, and identify a range of strategies to support the educator to incorporate emotion within their ethics teaching. (shrink)

Medical decision making when a patient cannot participate is complicated by the question of whose voice should be heard. The most common answer to this question is that “autonomy” is paramount, and therefore it is the voice of the unwell person that should be given priority. Advance care planning processes and practices seek to capture this sentiment and to allow treatment preferences to be documented and decision makers to be nominated. Despite good intentions, advance care planning is often deficient because (...) it is unable to facilitate a relational approach to decision making in cases when the patient’s competence is reduced. In this article we present findings from a study of the ways in which older people and their significant others understand decision making in such circumstances. Critical to the participants’ understanding was the emergent concept of “relational knowing,” a concept that is poorly articulated in the advance care planning literature. Our findings suggest that the dominant understanding of decision making in conditions of impaired competence is incomplete and obscures much of what matters to people. We conclude that, having recognized a broader set of ethical concerns, it is necessary to develop a relational and narrative based approach that applies in appropriate settings. (shrink)

Ethical concerns about therapeutic misconception have been raised since the early 1980s. This concept was originally described as research participants' assumptions that decisions relating to research interventions are made on the basis of their individual therapeutic needs. The term has since been used to refer to a range of ‘misunderstandings’ that research participants may have. In this paper, we describe a new concept—therapeutic appropriation. Therapeutic appropriation occurs when patients, or clinicians, actively reframe research participation as an opportunity to enhance patients' (...) clinical care, while simultaneously acknowledging the generalised research aims. To illustrate the concept of therapeutic appropriation, we draw on data from an interview study which we conducted to investigate the experiences of patients and general practitioners involved in clinical trials in primary care. We argue that therapeutic appropriation has two key elements: comprehension that the research project is not necessarily aiming to benefit participants and the deliberate use of incidental features of the research for personal therapeutic benefit of various kinds. We conclude that therapeutic appropriation is a useful concept that refines understanding of potential ethical problems in clinical research, and points to strategies to address them. (shrink)

The proliferation of digital data and internet-based research technologies is transforming the research landscape, and researchers and research ethics communities are struggling to respond to the ethical issues being raised. This paper discusses the findings from a collaborative project that explored emerging ethical issues associated with the expanding use of digital data for research. The project involved consulting with researchers from a broad range of disciplinary fields. These discussions identified five key sets of issues and informed the development of guidelines (...) orientated to meet the needs of researchers and ethics committee members. We argue that establishing common approaches to assessing ethical risks of research involving digital data will promote consistency in the ethical standards for research, enable the smooth functioning of ethics committees, and sustain public confidence in research. We conclude with recommendations for the development of educational resources for ethics committees, data management guidelines and further public education. (shrink)

The concept of deliberation in the Ukrainian philosophical discourse is both underestimated and overestimated. Underestimated — as a self-sufficient category that is not reducible to another con- cept, even if it is the concept of consensus or the concept of democracy. Deliberation appears pri- marily as a careful weighing and selection of arguments when making an important decision. Collegiality may or may not be present here, as well as openness. Therefore, the concept of deliber- ation is somewhat overestimated as something (...) that necessarily improves the quality of democratic procedures, and therefore, supposedly, deliberation itself is something democratic in nature. American political philosopher Joshua Cohen drew attention to the fact that deliberation can be of at least three types: individual deliberation, jury deliberation, and oligarch deliberation. The article analyzes these three types of deliberation and found that the closest to the democratic type of government is individual deliberation, or rather, joint deliberation of responsible citizens. While the deliberation of the jury is mostly closed, it is naturally limited access to the extent of the necessary competence of its possible participants. The deliberation of the oligarchs is even more closed and often even secret. However, the article states that it is more appropriate to replace the name «oligarchs» with the term «captains of business»: then the deliberation of the oligarchs ceases to be a cartel conspiracy, and turns into a coordinated protection of the interests of the national economy. However, for this, de- liberation itself is not enough, so not procedural, but other, namely, value factors of decision-making are needed. Democracy benefits from deliberation when the latter is complemented by the liberal and patriotic values of the participants in the deliberation. Already John Locke convincingly argues the importance of citizens achieving a common conscious agreement in state matters. However, for Locke, the very fact of having property was important, while in practice, achieving an effective agreement requires mechanisms for reconciling the positions of owners with very different amounts of property. To some extent, this problem can be solved by John Rawls` concept of justice. (shrink)

Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description has been recently re-examined in frequently controversial epistemo-logical contributions. The present essay reflects upon the pertinent papers by D. F. Pears, J. Hintikka, R. Chisholm, W. Sellars, A. J. Ayer, and others, but is pri-marily founded on Russell’s significant formulations from his writings published between 1910 and 1918. By employing an auxiliary device of a late-Wittgen-steinian language game, I explore at first the situation in which human subject is “experiencing” and (...) naming particular objects and later the subject’s acquaintance with universals. The reconstruction of such situations shows that, contrary to Russell’s assumptions, even the “purest” acquaintance cannot function without knowledge by description, i.e. without sta-ting propositions about the object of acquaintance . Then the only “descriptionless” alternative would be a kind of intuitive knowledge of such objects which is difficult to reconcile with the position held by Russell in the 1910s. Whatever the consequences, this topic retains its fundamental epistemological significance. (shrink)