In this chapter, Grace Andrus de Laguna examines cultural relativism and its bearing on science.

This chapter is Grace Andrus de Laguna's discussion of Margaret Floy Washburn’s The Animal Mind.

This chapter is Grace Andrus de Laguna’s discussion of the relationship between mind and brain.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this chapter, Grace Andrus de Laguna and Theodore de Laguna critically examine the pragmatist theory of knowledge and offer their own alternative to it.

In this chapter, Grace Andrus de Laguna presents and argues for perspectivism about perception.

In this article, Grace Andrus de Laguna develops a view of human freedom, one according to which it is made possible by the uniqueness of human individuals and the cultural worlds in which they live.

The papers presented at the Chicago Darwin Centennial suggest a fresh approach to the philosophical problem of ends in nature. In order to avoid the implications of "teleology," assumed to refer only to the process of evolution as directed towards goals, the discussants use "teleonomy" in reference to the biological organism as end-directed . They accept "teleonomy" only as descriptive, and neglect its significance for theory. The present thesis is that each of the three recognized phases of universal evolution: inorganic, (...) organic, and post-organic initiated by the advent of man and his culture, is characterized and made possible by the emergence of a distinctive type of teleonomic organization. While the process of evolutionary change is not itself end-directed to any goal, the end-directed structures which arise are not only "in nature" but are themselves crucial factors in evolution, since it is on them that natural selection operates. By using the concept of teleonomy, it is argued, one can avoid the issue of "mechanism" versus "teleology.". (shrink)

It is only within the human world of culture and as a member of a community of persons that the individual can realize his native potentialities and become a person. As a member of this community he must learn to play many roles. Some he plays successively as he passes through the stages of his life; others he plays alternately or simultaneously. The playing of each calls for the exercise of special abilities and powers. It makes use of only a (...) part of the native resources of his individual endowment. An individual may be better fitted by nature to play one role than another. But in the playing of any, he undergoes a specialized development which may help or hinder the development essential to the playing of others. Roles differ widely in the demands they make and the opportunities they offer for the exercise of native powers and the realization of capacities for intelligence and feeling. But however great may be the demands it makes or the opportunities it provides, no role is exhaustive of all that a person has the potentiality for becoming or of what he has become as the person he is. To be a person he must play more than one role and combine the playing of many. (shrink)

This commentary aims to place Grace de Laguna’s critique of pragmatism in its historical context. It examines her 1904 response to Henry Heath Bawden, her 1909 attack on John Dewey’s immediate empiricism, and her 1910 book Dogmatism and Evolution, focusing on the following question: Why did she describe her approach as an attempt to complete the pragmatists’ Darwinian revolution in logic?

Grace de Laguna’s philosophical work was bold and original. She was also able to connect together seemingly disparate strands of the pragmatic, metaphysical and psychological research going on around her, as Joel Katzav shows in his paper. This commentary gives some historical background to her academic career in an attempt to explain how she could have been forgotten as a philosopher. Social and institutional factors led to her work not being recognized when she wrote and thus sinking into (...) obscurity in philosophical circles afterwards. Although her work was initially widely read, her research seems not to have had any continuing direct impact on later developments in philosophy. However, it is crucial to restore her thought to its rightful place in the history of our subject. (shrink)

Joel Katzav’s article describes and explains the realist perspectivist views of Grace de Laguna, showing the distinctiveness of her positions in a number of fields. My focus will be on her views of the self and persons, and how they are embedded in their communities, experience emotions, and develop morality. As Katzav outlines, de Laguna’s position can be characterized as a form of speculative philosophy that develops an ontology of modes of being. Katzav sees speculative philosophy and (...) naturalism intertwining in her work as de Laguna extends and criticizes science (the speculative aspect) as well as drawing on it (the naturalistic aspect). De Laguna’s project is to create a philosophical system that can be communicated to others. This system, according to Katzav, uses imagination, metaphor, and paradoxical formulations, such as ‘qualitative uniqueness’ to describe individuality, in a way that is common in continental philosophy. My commentary examines de Laguna’s views as they are set out by Katzav and suggests how his article opens up lines of philosophical inquiry concerning the self, community and morality. De Laguna’s views on these issues can also usefully be compared to those of Hannah Arendt to see how her articulation of these themes intersects with and differs from Arendt’s ideas. (shrink)