In our attempts to achieve privacy and reputation deliverables, advocating for service providers and other data managers to open Big Data black boxes and be more transparent about consent processes, algorithmic details, and data practice is easy. Moving from this call to meaningful forms of transparency, where the Big Data details are available, useful, and manageable is more difficult. Most challenging is moving from that difficult task of meaningful transparency to the seemingly impossible scenario of achieving, consistently and ubiquitously, meaningful (...) forms of consent, where individuals are aware of data practices and implications, understand these realities, and agree to them as well. This commentary unpacks these concerns in the online consent context. It emphasizes that self-governance fallacy pervades current approaches to achieving digital forms of privacy, exemplified by the assertion that transparency and information access alone are enough to help individuals achieve privacy and reputation protections. (shrink)

In 1927, Walter Lippmann published The Phantom Public, denouncing the ‘mystical fallacy of democracy.’ Decrying romantic democratic models that privilege self-governance, he writes: “I have not happened to meet anybody, from a President of the United States to a professor of political science, who came anywhere near to embodying the accepted ideal of the sovereign and omnicompetent citizen.” Almost 90 years later, Lippmann’s pragmatism is as relevant as ever, and should be applied in new contexts where similar self-governance concerns persist. (...) This paper does just that, repurposing Lippmann’s argument in the context of the ongoing debate over the role of the digital citizen in Big Data management. It is argued that proposals by the Federal Trade Commission, the White House and the US Congress, championing failed notice and choice privacy policy, perpetuate a self-governance fallacy comparable to Lippmann’s, referred to here as the fallacy of data privacy self-management. Even if the digital citizen had the faculties and the system for data privacy self-management, the digital citizen has little time for data governance. We desire the freedom to pursue the ends of digital production, without being inhibited by the means. We want privacy, and safety, but cannot complete all that is required for its protection. If it is true that the fallacy of democracy is similar to the fallacy of data privacy self-management, then perhaps the pragmatic solution is representative data management: a combination of non/for-profit digital dossier management via infomediaries that can ensure the protection of personal data, while freeing individuals from what Lippmann referred to as an ‘unattainable ideal.’. (shrink)

This article examines the three works of Jeremy Bentham on capital punishment dating Irom 1775, 1809, and 1831. Besides Hugo Bedau’s analysis of Bentham’s 1775 and 1831 works and James Crimmins’s assessment of Bentham’s 1809 work, little attention has been paid to his abolitionist arguments on this contentious issue. I review some of the developments in Bentham’s position, noting where the later work corrects some deficiencies in the earlier work, and I assess the cogency of the position as it (...) evolves. I concentrate on deterrence and irremissibility, though I also comment on his discussion of popularity in his 1831 address and his 1775 essay.Cet article se penche sur les trois textes qu’a écrits Jeremy Bentham sur la peine capitale (ils datent de 1775, 1809 et 1831). Hormis l’analyse qu’a faite Hugo Bedau des textes de 1775 et 1831 et la prise en compte, par Benjamin Crimmins, de celui de 1809, la position abolitionniste de Bentham sur cette question controversée ne s’est méritée que très peu d’attention de la part des spécialistes. Je passe en revue le développement de quelques-unes des argumentations de Bentham, en soulignant sur quels points les ouvrages publiés plus tard corrigent certains délauts de ceux publiés auparavant, et j’évalue la cohérence de son argumentation dans le cadre de cette évolution. Je concentre mon attention sur les notions de dissuasion et d’irrémissibilité, tout en commentant le traitement qu’il fait de la question de lapopularité dans son discours de 1831 et dans son texte de 1775. (shrink)