The aim of this paper is to resolve the tension between Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent; justice-perfection; and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons for the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions of (...) its applicability. For example, some emphasize its religious dimension, whereas others understand it in the political sense. In this paper, I adopt a different approach in understanding the highest good’s systematic meaning as the moral confirmation, and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine. Additionally, it explains the importance of the different branches (such as philosophies of religion and of politics) of Kant’s system. (shrink)

The distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in Kant’s Prolegomena has long been a controversial issue in Kantian studies. On the one hand, this distinction challenges the close connection between the synthetic unity of self-consciousness and the categories. On the other hand, a distinction between the subjective and the objective is unavoidable in our cognitive life. I will show in this paper that the interpretive difficulties arise from the ambiguity of Kant’s use of the concept of perception (...) and his misleading formulation of the judgments of perception. After clarifying these problems and adopting the regulative use of the concept of the I in Kant’s theory of perception, the place of judgments of perception in his transcendental cognitive theory can be clarified, and the consistency of his system can be observed. (shrink)