Ryle and the Immediacy of First-Person Authority

Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 32 (1):157-164 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper is an endeavor to discuss Gilbert Ryle’s philosophy of mind in convergence with some contemporary debates, particularly the “immediacy” debate of first-person authority. An attempt has been made to show that Ryle’s thought when analyzed through the prism of immediacy debate of first-person authority also seems to claim and endorse first-person authority.

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Muzaffar Ali Malla
University of Pune

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Knowing One's Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge.Quassim Cassam (ed.) - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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