Descartes and First Person Authority

History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (2):181-189 (1992)

Steven L. Reynolds
Arizona State University
Although Descartes apparently needs first person authority for his anti-skeptical project, his scattered remarks on it appear to be inconsistent. Why did he neglect this issue? According to E M Aurley, Descartes was answering Pyrrhonian skeptics, who could not consistently challenge him on it. This paper argues instead that Descartes assumed that his first person premises were certain qua clear and distinct perceptions, leaving first person authority a side issue
Keywords Descartes  First Person Authority
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,122
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Socratic Authority.Raphael Woolf - 2008 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 90 (1):1-38.
On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.
Elusive Reasons: A Problem for First-Person Authority.Krista Lawlor - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):549-565.
Davidson and First-Person Authority: Parataxis and Self-Expression.Rockney Jacobsen - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):251-266.
The Authority of Reflection.Carla Bagnoli - 2007 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.


Added to PP index

Total views
25 ( #378,118 of 2,289,296 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #589,325 of 2,289,296 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature