Abstract

A central assumption of liberal moral theory is that moral agents are independent individuals who freely choose the values that guide their actions. Critics argue that such a view, and the political structure it supports, undermine the social frameworks of community and family that help constitute the agent's moral identity. One criticism in particular says that liberalism ignores the special nature of relationships of dependence, which call for a different kind of moral theory from one based on universal principles chosen by abstract agents in an ideal social contract. Some of the special moral implications of relations of dependence can be grounded in a modified utilitarianism that permits, and even requires, partiality toward the dependent. In addition to the familiar relations of dependence highlighted by critics , there are morally significant relations of dependence of which both theory and people in general are unaware. These are relations of material interdependence, which are universal, constant, and essential to human life. In modern capitalism these relations are necessarily obscure to the people in them, so that they no longer serve as an experiential foundation for moral consciousness as they once did. A thorough analysis of these relations and how they are manifested in modern society will help to understand the moral implications both of these relations and of their obscurity. One consequence of this obscurity is that the problems with liberalism and modernity pointed to by the critics go much deeper and are more intractable than they realize