The logic of `if' — or how to philosophically eliminate conditional relations

Sorites 19:51-57 (2007)
Abstract
In this paper I present some of Robert N. McLaughlin's critique of a truth functional approach to conditionals as it appears in his book On the Logic of Ordinary Conditionals. Based on his criticism I argue that the basic principles of logic together amount to epistemological and metaphysical implications that can only be accepted from a logical atomist perspective. Attempts to account for conditional relations within this philosophical framework will necessarily fail. I thus argue that it is not truth functionality as such that is the problem, but the philosophical foundation of modern logic.
Keywords Conditionals  Truth functionality  Compositionality  Logic
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