Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):181-208 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory.

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Citations of this work

If P, Then P!Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (12):645-679.
The power of naive truth.Hartry Field - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):225-258.
Alternative Logics and Applied Mathematics.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):399-424.
Properties, Propositions and Conditionals.Hartry Field - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (2):112-146.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Relevant Restricted Quantification.J. C. Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587-598.
Quick completeness proofs for some logics of conditionals.John P. Burgess - 1981 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (1):76-84.

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