Dialectica 60 (4):475-483 (2006)
Papineau’s argument in "Thinking About Consciousness" for the vagueness or indeterminacy of phenomenal concepts is discussed. Several problems with his argument are brought out, and it is concluded that his argument fails to establish his desired conclusion.
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References found in this work BETA
Conscious Beings in a Gradual World.Peter K. Unger - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):287-333.
Citations of this work BETA
Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.
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