Authors
Brent Silby
Ao Tawhiti Unlimited
Abstract
In his paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", Ned Block claims that the concept of consciousness is best described as a mongrel concept. For Block, the word "consciousness" refers to many different concepts and phenomena that have been bundled together under the one concept. Block suggests that we run into problems when we analyse certain aspects of consciousness using premises that cannot be applied to other aspects of consciousness. In an effort to clear up the confusion associated with reasoning about consciousness, Block breaks consciousness down into several different concepts. In this paper I will be concerned only with what Block calls access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. These two concepts appear to constitute his primary distinction and deserve attention. I will consider David Chalmers' contribution to the issue and will then outline an alternative view offered by Daniel Dennett.
Keywords Consciousness  Ned Block  David Chalmers  Daniel Dennett  Access Consciousness  Phenomenal Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience?David J. Chalmers - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 148-149.
Fallacies or Analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?Adam J. Rock & Stanley Krippner - 2007 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 26 (1):33-40.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-03-04

Total views
104 ( #99,663 of 2,433,424 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #55,877 of 2,433,424 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes