Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78 (2008)
The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind-body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments, and intuitions?makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely, parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Van Gulick's Solution of the Exclusion Problem Revisited.Janez Bregant - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):83-94.
Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251-262.
Exclusion Again.Karen Bennett - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?Lei Zhong - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):129-147.
Excluding Exclusion: The Natural(Istic) Dualist Approach. Istv - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67 – 78.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads270 ( #11,473 of 2,154,092 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #224,989 of 2,154,092 )
How can I increase my downloads?