Excluding exclusion: the natural(istic) dualist approach

Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67-78 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind–body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism – its form, commitments, and intuitions – makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,075

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Exclusion Excluded.Brad Weslake - forthcoming - In Alastair Wilson & Katie Robertson (eds.), Levels of Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Excluding exclusion: The natural(istic) dualist approach. Istv - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):67 – 78.
Can Counterfactuals Solve the Exclusion Problem?Lei Zhong - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):129-147.
Exclusion again.Karen Bennett - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 280--307.
Overdetermination And The Exclusion Problem.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):251-262.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
295 (#69,143)

6 months
6 (#524,433)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

István Aranyosi
Bilkent University

Citations of this work

A New Argument for Mind–Brain Identity.István Aranyosi - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):489-517.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.

View all 37 references / Add more references