Idea y abstracción en Hume

Anuario Filosófico:463-491 (1992)
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Abstract

Hume propounds the aporetic principle of correspondence betwen impressions and ideas, in order to solve the problem of the genesis of the ideas. This principle, which lacks universal validity, reduces the idea to image and deprives it of universality. In this way is postulated a rigorous and universal nominalism, which converts the ideas into non referential unities the same as the Urimpressions (Husserl) and sets aside the possibility of metaphysics.

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