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Kienhow Goh
National University of Singapore
  1.  49
    Between Determinism and Indeterminism: The Freedom of Choice in Fichte's Das System Der Sittenlehre.Kien-How Goh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):439-455.
    This paper examines Fichte's conception of the freedom of choice in Das System der Sittenlehre of 1798 as a solution to the dilemma posed by determinism and indeterminism. It show that Fichte does not simply affirm an indifferent power of voluntary choice, but demonstrates how such a power might co-exist with the measure of regularity and lawfulness we normally admit of human choices. Particular choices do not occur at random, but are based on general reasons. These reasons are in turn (...)
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  2.  12
    David James , Fichte's Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue . Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Kien-How Goh - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (4):278-280.
    This book review offers the reader some perspectives on David James' book Fichte's Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue as well as a concise summary of its contents.
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  3.  14
    Dean Moyar , Hegel's Conscience . Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Kien-How Goh - 2012 - Philosophy in Review 32 (2):121-123.
    This book review offers the reader some perspectives on Dean Moyar's book Hegel's Conscience as well as a concise summary of its contents.
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    Reading Hume's Inference From Constancy From the Vulgar Standpoint.Kien-How Goh - 2012 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):237-253.
    Recent work on Hume's Theory of Perception has shown that Hume takes the appearance of impressions to vary according to the ideas under which they are subsumed. In this paper, I argue that the vulgar position in the section where he discusses the Inference from Constancy is characterised by an ideal primordial state of mind where impressions are directly encountered without being subsumed under any idea. In particular, impressions which are not subsumed under the idea of a perception do not (...)
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