Abstract
How are we to explain the sort of evil exemplified by Shakespeare's Richard III? Some authors argue that we can only understand this sort of evil as undertaken for its own sake and, in this sense, as ‘diabolical’. Michelle Kosch has argued that Kierkegaard is such an author. In this article I have two aims. My first is to argue that Kierkegaard's analysis of what he calls ‘demonic evil’ offers a psychologically nuanced and compelling account of a distinctive quality of evil without ever abandoning the idea that action is always performed under the guise of the good. My second aim is to connect Kierkegaard's psychological analysis with his broader ethico-religious concerns and, in this way, to do justice to the unity of his ethico-religious psychology as anatomical, diagnostic and therapeutic. To this end, in the second half of this article I aim to show how Kierkegaard's psychology of the demonic is the basis for his valuation of silence as an ethico-religious ideal.