Concept possession

Philosophical Issues 9:331-338 (1998)
George Bealer
Yale University
This paper answers critical responses to the author’s “A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession.” The paper begins with a discussion of candidate counterexamples to the proposed analysis of concept possession -- including, e.g., a discussion of its relationship to Frank Jackson’s Mary example. Second, questions concerning the author’s general methodological approach are considered. For instance, it is shown that -- contrary to the critics’ suggestions -- an analysis of concept possession cannot invoke belief alone, but must also invoke intuition. Finally, a defense is given for the realist framework within which the theory of concepts, and of their possession conditions, is formulated.
Keywords Concept  Empiricism  Intuition  Possession  Propositional Attitudes  Rationalism  Realism  Kim, J  Orlando, E  Sosa, E  Tomberlin, J
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DOI 10.2307/1522982
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