Concept possession

Philosophical Issues 9:331-338 (1998)

George Bealer
Yale University
This paper answers critical responses to the author’s “A Theory of Concepts and Concept Possession.” The paper begins with a discussion of candidate counterexamples to the proposed analysis of concept possession -- including, e.g., a discussion of its relationship to Frank Jackson’s Mary example. Second, questions concerning the author’s general methodological approach are considered. For instance, it is shown that -- contrary to the critics’ suggestions -- an analysis of concept possession cannot invoke belief alone, but must also invoke intuition. Finally, a defense is given for the realist framework within which the theory of concepts, and of their possession conditions, is formulated.
Keywords Concept  Empiricism  Intuition  Possession  Propositional Attitudes  Rationalism  Realism  Kim, J  Orlando, E  Sosa, E  Tomberlin, J
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DOI 10.2307/1522982
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References found in this work BETA

What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?Kurt Gödel - 1947 - In Solomon Feferman, John Dawson & Stephen Kleene (eds.), Journal of Symbolic Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 176--187.

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Citations of this work BETA

Saving the Doxastic Account of Intuitions.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375.
Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.
Epistemology Without Intuition.Manhal Hamdo - 2018 - International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities 3 (10):49-53.

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