Abstract

This paper presents a new puzzle for certain positions in the theory of truth. The relevant positions can be stated in a language including a truth predicate T and an operation that takes sentences to names of those sentences; they are positions that take the T-schema A ↔ T to hold without restriction, for every sentence A in the language. As such, they must be based on a nonclassical logic, since paradoxes that cannot be handled classically will arise. The bestknown of these paradoxes is probably the liar paradox – a sentence that says of itself that it is not true – but our concern here is not with the liar. Instead, our focus is a variant of Curry ’s paradox – a sentence that says of itself that if it is true, everything is [3, 5, 7, 11]. In §1, we present the standard version of Curry ’s paradox and the strain of response to it we wish to focus on. This strain of response crucially invokes non-normal worlds: worlds at which the laws of logic differ from the laws that actually hold. In §2, we go on to argue that, in light of temporal curry paradox, this strain of response ought also to accept non-normal times: times at which the laws of logic in the actual world differ from the laws that hold now. We then consider, in §3, what this would mean for the theorists in question