Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):347-356 (2021)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion.
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-019-10031-9
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References found in this work BETA

Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
The Limits of Free Will: Replies to Bennett, Smith and Wallace. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):357-373.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Limits of Free Will: Replies to Bennett, Smith and Wallace. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):357-373.
Vicious Times.Ezio Di Nucci - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):847-849.
Limits of Responsibility? [REVIEW]Ezio Di Nucci - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):317-319.

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