Reasons Without Rationalism

Princeton University Press (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question "Why should I be moral?" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. In Reasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The "should" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this "virtue theory" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act "under the guise of the good," or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action, Reasons without Rationalism is essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,252

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Standards of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW]Matthew Silverstein - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):631-638.
Reasons with rationalism after all.Michael Smith - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):521-530.
Reply to Bratman and Smith.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):531-540.
Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.
Rationalism in Ethics.Noell Birondo - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. pp. 4329-4338.
Sympathy for the devil.Kieran Setiya - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. pp. 82--110.
Kieran Setiya, reasons without rationalism. [REVIEW]Iskra Fileva - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):521-530.
Internal Reasons.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - In Kieran Setiya & Hille Paakkunainen (eds.), Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press. pp. 56-82.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-05-18

Downloads
145 (#124,683)

6 months
27 (#106,033)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).

View all 173 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references