Abstract

This paper presents a dilemma for internalism in epistemology—a view according to which a person’s belief is justified only if that person is aware (or potentially aware) of something that contributes to that belief’s justification. The dilemma says that either this required awareness involves conceiving of the object of awareness as contributing to the relevant belief’s justification or it does not. If it does, then internalism is saddled with vicious regress problems; if it does not, then internalism falls prey to a prominent objection to externalism. Either way, we should not endorse internalism. After defending each of the steps in this objection to internalism, I consider whether certain internalist views (those of Paul Moser, Richard Fumerton, and Laurence BonJour) can escape this dilemma. I conclude that they cannot. An Appendix to the paper raises objections to a similar dilemma proposed by Stephen Hetherington.