Dissertation, Uppsala University (2011)
AbstractIn this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Putnam agreed with Quine that there are no absolute a priori truths. In particular, he was critical of the notion of truth by convention. Instead he developed a notion of relative a priori truth, that is, a notion of necessary truth with respect to a body of knowledge, or a conceptual scheme. Putnam's position on necessity has developed over the years and has always been connected to his important contributions to the philosophy of meaning. I study Hilary Putnam's development through an early phase of scientific realism, a middle phase of internal realism, and his later position of a natural or commonsense realism. I challenge some of Putnam’s ideas on mathematical necessity, although I have largely defended his views against some other contemporary major philosophers; for instance, I defend his conceptual relativism, his conceptual pluralism, as well as his analysis of the realism/anti-realism debate.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Hilary Putnam: Realism, Reason and the Uses of Uncertainty.Christopher Norris - 2002 - Distributed in the U.S. By Palgrave.
Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction.Jürgen Dümont - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Putnam's Natural Realism and the Question of a Perceptual Interface.David Macarthur - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):167-181.
Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity).H. G. Callaway - 1985 - Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Putnam's Retreat: Some Reflections on Hilary Putnam's Changing Views About Metaphysical Necessity.Bob Hale - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):351–378.
Natural Realism, Anti-Reductionism, and Intentionality: The 'Phenomenology' of Hilary Putnam.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - In Phenomenology of Hilary Putnam in Space, Time, and Culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Book Review:Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers Hilary Putnam; Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers Hilary Putnam. [REVIEW]Hugh Lehman - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):151-.
Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.