Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?

Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260 (2010)
Authors
John Bickle
Mississippi State University
Abstract
The previous decade has seen renewed critical interest in the multiple realization argument. These criticisms constitute a "second wave" of challenges to this central argument in late-20th century philosophy of mind. Unlike the first wave, which challenged the premise that multiple realization is inconsistent with reduction or type identity, this second wave challenges the truth of the multiple realization premise itself. Since psychoneural reductionism was prominent among the explicit targets of the multiple realization argument, one might think that this second wave of challenges provides important aid and comfort to reductionists. In this paper, however, I provide reasons for thinking it does not. This is not to the detriment of psychoneural reductionism because, as I also argue here, and unrecognized by the current non-reductive orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, one key argument among the first wave of criticisms of the multiple realization argument has never been adequately rejoined
Keywords Multiple realization argument  Psychoneural reductionism  Metascience  Molecular neuroscience
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9843-y
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References found in this work BETA

Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.

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Citations of this work BETA

Functional Kinds: A Skeptical Look.Cameron Buckner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3915-3942.
The Case for Multiple Realization in Biology.Wei Fang - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (1-2):3.
Redefining Physicalism.Guy Dove - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):513-522.
Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability.Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):881-902.
Reduction Redux.Lawrence Shapiro - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68:10-19.

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