Multiple realization, computation and the taxonomy of psychological states

Synthese 114 (3):445-461 (1998)
Abstract
The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
Keywords Computation  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Psychology  Realization
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1005072701509
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,820
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Why We View the Brain as a Computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization?Michael Pauen - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):37-49.
Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
Variable Realization: Not Proven.Nick Zangwill - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):214-19.
Autonomy and Multiple Realization.Robert C. Richardson - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):526-536.
Multiple Realization and Evidence.Sungsu Kim - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749.
Realization and Multiple Realization, Chicken and Egg.Thomas W. Polger - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):862-877.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
72 ( #79,136 of 2,210,224 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #385,054 of 2,210,224 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature