Synthese 114 (3):445-461 (1998)
The paper criticizes standard functionalist arguments for multiple realization. It focuses on arguments in which psychological states are conceived as computational, which is precisely where the multiple realization doctrine has seemed the strongest. It is argued that a type-type identity thesis between computational states and physical states is no less plausible than a multiple realization thesis. The paper also presents, more tentatively, positive arguments for a picture of local reduction.
|Keywords||Computation Functionalism Metaphysics Psychology Realization|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Integrating Psychology and Neuroscience: Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.
Explanation and Description in Computational Neuroscience.David Michael Kaplan - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):339-373.
Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale.Ken Aizawa - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):493-510.
The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
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