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Analysis 73 (1):57-62 (2013)
Authors
John Biro
University of Florida
Abstract
The so–called truthmaker solution to the problem Gettier is thought to have posed for the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief is to add a fourth condition, requiring that one’s evidence for one’s belief be the state of affairs that makes the belief true. Adrian Heathcote argues that the reason why one lacks knowledge in Russell’s case of the stopped clock is that, as in the classic Gettier–style cases, this condition is not satisfied. I argue that the proposed solution fails, as it embodies a misunderstanding of what evidence is
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans128
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Gettier and the Stopped Clock.A. Heathcote - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):309-314.
The Gettier Problem.Scott Sturgeon - 1993 - Analysis 53 (3):156-164.

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